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Abstract
Do governments strategically choose debt maturity to fill supply gaps across
maturities? Building on a new panel data set of more than 9,000 individual
Eurozone government debt issues between 1999 and 2015, I find that gov-
ernments increase long-term debt issues following periods of low aggregate
Eurozone long-term debt issuance, and vice versa. This gap-filling behavior
is more pronounced for (1) less financially constrained and (2) higher rated
governments. Using the ECB’s three-year LTRO in 2011-2012 as an event
study, I find that core governments filled the supply gap of longer matu-
rity debt, which resulted from peripheral governments accommodating banks’
short-term debt demand for “carry trades”. This gap-filling implies that gov-
ernments act as macro-liquidity providers across maturities, thereby adding
significant risk absorption capacity to government bond markets.
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1 Introduction
Governments actively decide on their debt maturity structure by issuing debt across
maturities. The maturity structure of government debt portfolios is important as
it affects creditor losses in debt restructurings, long-term interest rates, exposure to
fluctuating funding costs, debt sustainability levels, and consequently governments’
vulnerability to crises (e.g., Kim (2015), Beetsma et al. (2016), and Asonuma et al.
(2017)). There are a number of established theories of government debt maturity
choice, but these theories predominantly focus on funding costs and funding needs
(e.g., Cole and Kehoe (2000), Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), and Aguiar
et al. (2016)). An alternative explanation is strategic behavior. One of the leading
theories for strategic maturity choice from the corporate debt literature is gap-
filling (Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010), hereafter GHS (2010)). According to
gap-filling, governments’ debt issues would fill supply gaps across maturities, which
result from varying aggregate government financing patterns.1 However, gap-filling
has so far only been studied for corporates (GHS (2010), Badoer and James (2016),
and Foley-Fisher et al. (2016)). Governments’ gap-filling would nevertheless be
of particular importance, because governments acting as macro liquidity providers
would add significant risk absorption capacity to government bond markets.
In this paper, I investigate whether gap-filling is also an important determinant
of maturity choice in the government bond market. I use the Eurozone as a unique
laboratory, as multiple governments share the same institutional setup, but sepa-
rately choose debt maturity. After analyzing gap-filling over the full sample period,
I address possible endogeneity concerns in an event study by exploiting changes
in peripheral governments’ maturity choice (induced by peripheral banks’ “carry
trades”) following the ECB’s three-year LTRO in 2011-2012.2 In this setup, I ex-
amine three related questions: First, do governments engage in gap-filling maturity
choice? Second, how does governments’ gap-filling vary over time? And third, for
which types of governments is gap-filling more pronounced?
I hypothesize that gap-filling maturity choice also occurs in the government bond
market, because investors prefer the high quality and liquidity of government bonds
(Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), hereafter KVJ (2012)). Rather than
1According to the gap-filling theory, governments have a preference for a specific diversification
of their debt maturity. However, aggregated supply changes combined with investors’ preference for
long-term debt and arbitrageurs’ limited availability of capital can lead to a relative price change
between short- and long-term debt. To reduce expected funding costs, governments are willing to
adjust their supply of long-term debt.
2“Carry trades” constitute of purchasing high-yielding (peripheral) government bonds funded
by cheap ECB funding, and depositing these (peripheral) government bonds as collateral at the
ECB (see, for example, Acharya and Steffen (2015)).
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substituting government debt with corporate debt within a country (as in GHS
(2010)), investors seem to prefer substituting government debt across countries. In
the Eurozone, investors can easily substitute government debt across multiple coun-
tries for the following four reasons: (1) a common currency is shared across govern-
ments, (2) monetary policy is centralized across governments, (3) credit quality is
similar across multiple governments, and (4) financial regulation is largely identical
across governments. In addition, financial regulation and central bank open market
operations grant government debt preferential treatment–thereby further incentiviz-
ing investors to purchase government debt. Most importantly, financial regulation
grants reduced (up to zero) capital charges and no large exposure limits to govern-
ment debt. And the ECB classifies government debt as first category collateral in
its open market operations, independent of their actual liquidity. Finally, substitu-
tion with corporate debt is much more restricted in Europe compared to the U.S.,
because European corporations fund themselves mainly through bank debt rather
than bond debt.
Importantly, gap-filling should be most pronounced for governments’ long-term
(greater than 10 years) bond issues, because of higher duration risk capital for arbi-
trageurs (Badoer and James (2016)). As price volatility rises with a bonds maturity
due to higher discounting of future cash flows, regulatory capital requirements usu-
ally increase with maturity. Moreover, a large class of investors with long-term
liabilities, such as life insurance companies and pension funds, prefers purchasing
long-term government debt as maturity matching is most effective to reduce capital
requirements and comply with financial regulation.
In the cross-section, gap-filling should be more pronounced for less financially
constrained and higher rated governments. Less financially constrained governments
might engage more aggressively in gap-filling, due to their higher flexibility to adjust
the maturity structure of their debt issues (GHS (2010)). Higher rated governments
might undertake gap-filling more aggressively, as investors prefer the high quality of
government bond securities (KVJ (2012)).
To empirically analyze governments’ gap-filling, I construct a new panel data
set of 9,098 individual debt issues of 15 Eurozone governments between 1999 and
2015 from Bloomberg. To my knowledge, I am the first to compile such a large data
set of European government debt issues. For the event study, I also collect data
on individual bond auctions and hand-collect data on debt issuance announcements
for a smaller set of governments around the ECB’s three-year LTRO in 2011-2012.
This granular issuance- and auction-level data allows me to precisely observe gov-
ernments’ debt maturity choice. Importantly, it also allows me to split debt issues
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in multiple maturity buckets as in Badoer and James (2016) and analyze gap-filling
purely on a flow basis–that is using fluctuations in the flow of aggregate Eurozone
government long-term debt issues to explain the flow of an individual government’s
debt issues across maturities.3 In comparison, previous gap-filling studies use the
stock of long-term U.S. government debt to explain the flow or the stock of long-
term U.S. corporate debt. As a result of strict budget rules for governments in the
Eurozone, total debt issuance amounts within a period are fixed by governments’
maturing debt and budget deficits. Compared to corporates that can also adjust
total debt issuance amounts, Eurozone governments are restricted to adjusting the
debt issues’ maturity composition only.
My government bond data shows that deal characteristics of government debt
issues are very similar across countries. In addition, governments frequently issue
debt across maturities, enabling governments to easily shift debt issuance amounts
across the maturity spectrum. Overall, total issuance amounts are predominantly
short-term (up to one year, on average 50.5%), and long-term (greater than ten
years, on average 18.7%). Finally, and important for analyzing gap-filling, there
is substantial variation in aggregate Eurozone government long-term debt issuance
over time.
In a first step, I examine whether governments engage in gap-filling. Consistent
with gap-filling, I find that governments significantly increase long-term debt issues
(and significantly reduce short-term debt issues) following periods of low aggregate
Eurozone long-term government debt issuance, and vice versa. Governments per-
form gap-filling by shifting almost euro-for-euro between short-term and long-term
debt issues, leaving medium-term maturity buckets largely unaffected. Controlling
for government-level seasonality in debt issuance across all maturity buckets shows
that gap-filling is a temporary deviation from established debt issuance pattern.
In a second step, I investigate the variation of governments’ gap-filling over time.
According to the gap-filling theory, gap-filling only occurs under partially segmented
markets and limits to arbitrage. Partial segmentation might have increased as a
result of harmonizing EU insurance regulation (Solvency II), as it strengthened
insurer’s incentives for maturity matching. Limits to arbitrage might have become
more relevant since the last two financial crises and subsequent increases in financial
regulation. Consistent with the gap-filling theory, I only find governments’ gap-
filling behavior after the start of harmonizing EU insurance regulation in late 2009.
In a third step, I examine the cross-section of governments’ gap-filling. As dis-
cussed above, gap-filling might be more pronounced for less financially constrained
3My results are also robust to controlling for the stock of outstanding long-term debt.
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and higher rated governments. I find evidence consistent with these two cross-
sectional predictions. In particular, when I sequentially group governments across
different dimensions of financial constraints, I find significantly larger gap-filling
for governments with lower indebtedness, smaller size, lower financing needs, lower
budget deficits, and higher future economic growth.
The main concern with my gap-filling results is that governments might have
coordinated their debt supply, instead of responding to investor’s maturity-specific
demand. To address this endogeneity concern, I exploit peripheral governments in-
crease in shorter maturity debt issuance to accommodate banks demand for “carry
trades” following the ECB’s three-year LTRO in 2011-2012. These adjustments ef-
fectively resulted in a largely unexpected temporary negative credit supply shock of
longer maturity Eurozone government debt. Consistent with gap-filling, I find that
core governments responded by temporarily increasing longer maturity debt issues
by 16.5%-points to fill the supply gap. Measures of excess demand in governments’
longer maturity bond auctions, and changes in the slope of governments’ yield curve
are consistent with core governments responding to investor demand. In robustness
checks, I also provide evidence that the gap-filling result is (1) not driven by con-
founding events during the Eurozone crisis; (2) not driven by restricted maturity
choices of peripheral governments; (3) not driven by investor demand for safe assets;
and (4) constitutes a deviation from governments’ pre-announced issuance patterns.
These temporary adjustments in the maturity structure of debt issuances fol-
lowing the ECB’s three-year LTRO resulted in significant financial implications. In
aggregate, the average residual maturity of total outstanding debt of peripheral and
core governments diverged by 0.6 years in the LTRO-period, and did not converge
thereafter. Further, peripheral governments’ debt rollover requirements until 2016
increased by 51.4bn EUR (or 3.3% of GDP) for Italy and 49.1bn EUR (or 4.7% of
GDP) for Spain. In contrast, funding cost reduced by just 0.07% of GDP for Italy
(with a budget deficit of 2.9% of GDP) and 0.05% of GDP for Spain (with a budget
deficit of 10.4% of GDP) compared to not adjusting their debt maturity structure
in response to the ECB’s three-year LTRO. Consequently, peripheral governments
exploited banks “carry trade” demand as a temporary relief on debt rollover, de-
spite its negative implications for future debt rollover amounts. In contrast, core
governments’ gap-filling of long-term debt permanently reduced debt rollover re-
quirements by 74.2bn EUR (or 1.1% core governments GDP). In sum, these matu-
rity adjustments permanently stabilized core governments’ debt portfolios, while it
permanently destabilized peripheral governments’ debt portfolios.
My analysis contributes to three strands of the literature. First, my paper con-
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tributes to the literature on segmented bond markets across maturities (e.g. Vayanos
and Vila (2009), Greenwood and Vayanos (2014)) and the interaction of debt ma-
turity choices between corporates and the government (for example, GHS (2010),
Badoer and James (2016), and Foley-Fisher et al. (2016)). This literature shows that
segmented bond markets across maturities can arise from investors’ preferred habitat
for specific maturities, which induces corporates to strategically fill maturity-specific
supply gaps of government debt. In contrast, my paper is the first to investigate
gap-filling also in the government bond market. In addition, I study gap-filling
outside the U.S., and also analyze the cross-section of governments’ gap-filling.
Second, my paper adds to the literature studying the determinants of govern-
ments’ debt maturity choice (for example, Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012),
Broner et al. (2013), and Bai et al. (2015)).4 In summary, these empirical pa-
pers typically concentrate on the effect individual country-specific credit market
conditions, such as the spread, and investigate debt maturity choice in emerging
economies. In contrast, I focus on interactions in governments’ maturity choice
across multiple governments. In addition, my study is the first to systematically
analyze the determinants of governments’ debt maturity choice across Europe and
carefully controls for a variety of country-level credit market and macroeconomic
conditions.
Third, my paper also contributes to the recent literature on the effects of uncon-
ventional monetary policies on government bond markets (for example, Joyce and
Tong (2012), Eser and Schwaab (2016), and Krishnamurthy et al. (2017)). These
papers predominantly investigate the effect on bond prices and CDS spreads, ignor-
ing the effect on bond quantities. My paper is the first to investigate the effects of an
unconventional monetary policy on bond quantities. In addition, my paper shows
that adjustments on bond quantities of directly affected governments can induce
strategic interactions of other governments.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional setting.
Section 3 describes the data and presents summary statistics. Section 4 empirically
investigates gap-filling in the government bond market. Section 5 addresses endo-
geneity concerns in an event study using the ECB’s three-year LTRO. Section 6
concludes and draws some policy implications.
4Other papers explore the optimal maturity structure of entire debt portfolios and their impli-
cations on optimal taxation and insurance against fiscal shocks, among others, Barro (1979), Lucas
and Stokey (1983), Angeletos (2002), Buera and Nicolini (2004), and Debortoli et al. (2017).
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2 Institutional setting
2.1 Government debt management
The task of governments’ borrowing and debt management is performed by govern-
ment debt management offices (DMOs). Despite a strong interdependence of debt
management with the remaining fiscal policy and monetary policy, DMOs in the
Eurozone are separated from other parts of fiscal policy and operate independently
from monetary policy. Guided by a micro portfolio approach of debt management,
DMOs main objective constitutes a classical Markov problem: to reduce govern-
ment’s financing costs over a medium to long horizon, while limiting fiscal risks
(that are fluctuating funding costs, and rollover risks).5 A key element to achieve
this objective is debt maturity.
This objective, however, inherits a trade-off on debt maturity. Due to the mone-
tary premium for short-term government debt, funding costs for shorter maturities
are usually cheaper than for longer maturities. Yet, as shorter maturity debt has
to be refinanced more frequently than longer maturity debt, higher total annual
issuance amounts increase governments’ exposure to fluctuating funding costs and
rollover risk. As a result of this trade-off, governments usually diversify their debt
maturity structure and issue debt with both shorter and longer maturities.6
In addition, DMOs additionally aim to achieve resilient secondary market liquid-
ity for main benchmark maturities (for example, one, three, five, or ten year bonds).
To ensure deep secondary markets, regular debt issues in each benchmark maturity
are required, which might potentially conflict with the maturity trade-off of its main
objective. Specifically, once credit market conditions change, governments might be
slow to adjust the maturity of debt issues to ensure deep secondary market liquidity.
The DMOs’ debt maturity decisions are operationalized in their funding strategy.
Therein, government’s total borrowing requirements (comprised of debt redemptions
and primary surplus/deficit) are exogenous to the DMO, as they are a result of past
debt issuance decisions and current financing needs decided by the remaining fiscal
policy. Consequently, the DMO decides on the allocation of this fixed amount across
the maturity spectrum. To ensure predictability of debt issues and sufficient demand
5See the “Revised Guidelines for Public Debt Management” by the IMF and the World Bank
from 2014: https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/040114.pdf
6DMOs can also alter this trade-off by entering into interest rate swaps. However, issuing
long-term debt and entering into interest rate swaps to pay lower short-term yields increases the
volatility of debt servicing costs. In the Eurozone, DMOs’ outstanding interest rate swaps are at
most small, and over time DMOs partially even inter into offsetting interest rate swap positions.
Also, there is anecdotal evidence that increases in interest rate expenditures resulting from interest
rate swaps are more difficult to communicate to the Ministry of Finance.
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by investors at each auction, DMOs in the Eurozone announce information of their
funding strategy in advance. A general overview is provided at the annual level,
where the DMO announces its predicted annual funding requirements, maturity(-
range) specific auction dates, and partially the intended aggregated annual issuance
amount of money market (up to one year maturity) and capital market (above one
year maturity) debt issues. In contrast to emerging market debt issuances where
auction dates are dependent on credit market conditions, for Eurozone governments
the date of government bond auctions is therefore exogenous to credit market con-
ditions around the auction date. Despite pre-determined auction dates (and for
some DMOs also indications on the respective maturity), regular debt issues across
the maturity spectrum and variations in issue amounts allow DMOs to maintain a
high degree of freedom on their overall maturity choice at this stage. Usually at a
quarterly level, DMOs determine auction- or issuance-level specific targets on debt
issuance amounts, which to a large degree determine governments’ debt maturity
choice. While, DMOs officially keep the option to adjust their funding strategy de-
pending on market conditions and funding requirements. Historically however, debt
issues have rarely been canceled and realized debt issues are often similar as planned.
Consequently, DMOs in the Eurozone determine their debt maturity choice largely
at a quarterly level.
2.2 Investor demand for government debt
As government bonds are a large part of bond market in general, various investors
demand government debt. In the primary market, each government restricts the
number of banks (so-called primary dealers) that are allowed to bid in government
bond auctions. These banks, however, usually receive orders from other investors so
that also other investors have indirect access to debt issues in the primary market.
Additionally, all investors can buy and sell government bonds in secondary markets.
Since the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2007-2009, new regulatory
reforms further stipulated banks, and insurance companies to purchase government
bonds. For banks, new liquidity regulation under Basel III (the liquidity coverage
ratio, and net stable funding ratio) requires banks to hold government bonds as liq-
uidity reserves. Further, as high quality government bonds possess minimal credit
risk and high liquidity, banks usually use it as collateral for short-term borrowing.
And despite evidence on its credit risk from the European sovereign debt crisis,
government bonds continue to hold zero-risk weight in banks regulatory capital cal-
culations and government debt is exempt from concentration limits. For European
insurers, the new Solvency II regulation also exempts government bonds from credit
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and concentration risk under the standard formula in the solvency capital require-
ments (SCR) calculation.7 In addition, Solvency II particularly incentivizes insurers
to purchase government debt with specific maturities. Specifically, assets that per-
fectly match the maturity of liabilities are exempt from interest rate risks in the
computation of insurers’ capital requirements. Given that longer maturity liabilities
pose particularly high interest rate risk due to their high discounting effect, insur-
ers are particularly incentivized to purchase long-term government debt. This is
particularly the case for life insurance companies, where interest rate risk resulting
from maturity mismatches of assets and liabilities are often the largest component
of capital requirements.
The transition to the low yield environment further reinforced these incentives.
Lower yields increase asset values as future bond payments are discounted less, so
that capital charges for asset holdings - that are usually proportional to assets val-
ues - correspondingly increase. As lower yields also increase the present value of
long-term liabilities and widen existing duration mismatches between assets and lia-
bilities, falling long-term interest rates even induce insurance companies to increase
purchases of long-term government bonds at rising prices (Domanski et al. (2017)).
These regulatory reforms incentivize large classes of investors to buy govern-
ments bonds, so that aggregated demand for government debt might have become
more inelastic. Moreover, inelastic demand might have been particularly developed
for longer maturity government bonds, given insurers changed incentives to match
the maturity of long-term liabilities to reduce regulatory capital requirements. An
increase in the average duration of outstanding government debt in Europe from
six to seven years between 2008 and 2016 provides indicative evidence for increased
demand for long-term European government debt.8
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 Data
To analyze interactions in governments’ maturity choice, I collect data on govern-
ment’s individual bond issuances between January 1999 and September 2015 for
15 Eurozone governments: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and
7Nevertheless, SCR computed by internal models have to account for sovereign risk.
8See “The bond market is transformed: fewer vigilantes; more forced buyers” in the Economist
on Oct 22nd, 2016.
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Spain.9 The starting year of the sample differs across governments, and depends on
the date when governments joined the Eurozone.10 Data on individual government
bond issuances into the primary market are collected from Bloomberg, and contains
information on the usual characteristics of government bond issuances. I exclude
from my analysis bond issuances that are tied to specific infrastructure projects,
that are issued by fully owned public corporations owned by the central government
(for example, energy companies, nationalized banks, transportation companies) and
government investment funds, and that are obtained as part of ESM financial as-
sistance programs.11 I exclude these bond issuances, because the maturity choice
is likely to be aligned with the time horizon of specific investment or financing de-
cisions, and/or the maturity choice was likely determined to a large degree outside
the scope of the central government.
I restrict my sample to central government debt issuances, because strategic
maturity choices most likely occur at the highest level of government for two reasons.
First, as central government debt in the Eurozone is usually the majority of total
government debt, DMOs at the central level consequently issue most of the total
governments’ debt. Second, strategic maturity choices might be more pronounced
at the central level compared to multiple local governments. For example, at the
local level debt issues might be more inclined to match maturities of investment
projects, and maturity choice might be less sophisticated than at the center. In
addition, focusing on central government debt in a multi-country setting ensures
cross-country comparability (see De Broeck and Guscina (2011)). Despite limiting
my analysis to central government debt, the maturity structure remains however
very similar than those reported for total government debt in the ECB’s Statistical
Data Warehouse (SDW).
My focus on Eurozone governments stems from their unique institutional setup
that allows me to investigate gap-filling in the government bond market. The Euro-
zone currently consists of 19 governments, which predominantly issue debt denom-
inated in euro and are close substitutes in the Eurozone government bond market.
Many countries are of high credit quality, and government bond markets are very
liquid; two major bond characteristics preferred by investors (KVJ (2012)). In ad-
9These are all current Eurozone governments besides Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Luxem-
bourg, which all have zero or very low levels of central government debt and consequently only
sporadically issue central government bonds. Also, Latvia (2014) and Lithuania (2015) only joined
the Eurozone at the end of the sample period.
10The following governments joined the Eurozone after their inception in 1999: Greece (2001),
Cyprus (2008), Malta (2008), Slovenia (2007), and Slovakia (2009).
11Correspondingly, I exclude periods, in which governments did not have access to financial
markets.
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dition and as discussed above, financial regulation provides investors with different
incentives to purchase government debt rather than substituting with (high quality)
corporate debt. Also, the ECB classifies government debt as first category collateral
in its open market operations, and only accepts euro-denominated government debt
as collateral. Correspondingly, the start of my sample period is motivated by the
start of the Eurozone, which abolished national currencies of Eurozone governments
and thus increased the substitutability of Eurozone government debt.
To address endogeneity concerns in the event study, I also collect data on in-
dividual debt auction results and government’s debt issuance announcements for a
smaller set of governments around the ECB’s three-year LTRO in 2011-2012. Specif-
ically, I collect data on individual debt auction results for France, Germany, Italy,
and Spain and hand-collect data on debt issuance announcements for Germany and
Italy between 2010 and 2014. Also, I expand the bond issuance database by cen-
tral government bonds issued prior to 1999 and maturing in 2012 or thereafter for
computing outstanding debt maturity profiles.
My government bond data base is complemented by government-level data on
macroeconomic conditions from Datastream and Bloomberg at quarterly, or yearly
frequency. These variables are the government’s debt/GDP ratio, the total change
in the debt/GDP ratio in the previous four quarters, total real GDP growth dur-
ing the previous four quarters, the countries consumer price inflation (CPI) during
the prior year, a recession dummy computed based on two subsequent quarters of
negative GDP growth, and a non-investment grade rating dummy based on S&P’s
long-term local currency government rating. In addition, I complement the dataset
with data on credit market conditions from Bloomberg at the quarterly, or daily
frequency. These credit market condition measures are the term structure measured
as the yield differential between 10-year and 6-month government debt, the yield
level as measured by the governments’ 6-month yield, and the yield spread of 10-year
government debt securities to 10-year German bunds. For the cross-sectional analy-
sis, I also collect data on a countries size as measured by its GDP, and governments’
budget deficit at quarterly, respectively yearly frequency. To examine gap-filling
behavior, my measure for the supply of aggregated Eurozone long-term government
debt is the log of the aggregated deal amounts (converted to euro) of Eurozone
government debt issuances with maturities above ten years (hereafter AMT10).
The benefits of the AMT10 measure is that it precisely captures the new supply
of long-term Eurozone government debt to investors. As discussed above, long-
term government debt is more likely to be held to maturity by investors, so that
new supply of long-term Eurozone government debt substantially influences the
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availability of long-term Eurozone government debt in the market. Investors - such
as life insurance companies that aim to invest new premiums from customers in
government bonds to match long-term liabilities - create demand for new long-
term Eurozone government debt. Further, the supply of new government long-
term debt issues varies substantially over time (see Figure 1), which is contained
in the AMT10 measure. A potential drawback of the AMT10 measure is that it
does not reflect the total supply of outstanding Eurozone long-term government
debt. Nevertheless, total supply of Eurozone long-term government debt is relatively
stable over time and variations predominantly arise due to new Eurozone government
long-term debt issuances. To address this concern in the empirical analysis below,
I include country-year fixed effects in robustness specifications to control for the
changing level of government-level outstanding long-term debt over time (the results
continue to hold).
3.2 Descriptive statistics
The main data set contains 9,098 government debt issuances from Bloomberg be-
tween January 1999 and September 2015. Table I shows summary statistics of deal
characteristics, issuer characteristics, market characteristics, and the number of in-
dividual governments across five maturity buckets. The maturity buckets reflect
major issuance maturities of government securities and are similar than those used
by Broner et al. (2013). Panel A of Table 1 highlights that long-term (above 10
years) debt issues comprise only 677 debt issues (or 7.44% of total debt issues),
however the mean issuance amount is four times larger than short-term (up to one
year) debt issues. In addition, consistent with the monetary premium for short-term
government debt, Eurozone governments predominantly issue short-term (6,406 debt
issues, or 70.41% of total debt issues). Also as described above, deal characteristics
are generally very similar across Eurozone governments. For example, 87% of total
long-term debt issues are denominated in euro and about 95% of total long-term
issues are not puttable or callable (and thus repay at final maturity).
[Insert Table 1 near here]
Panel B of Table 1 shows issuer characteristics. Consistent with Eurozone govern-
ments being unable to dilute nominal debt with higher inflation as monetary policy
in the Eurozone is not set at individual governments national level (but centrally at
the ECB), mean inflation is about 1.8% for both short-term and long-term debt is-
sues. Consistent with mitigation of rollover risk and hedging motives, medium-term
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and long-term debt issues tend to be more pronounced for higher indebted govern-
ments. Moreover, as shown in Panel C of Table 1 displaying market characteristics,
medium-term to long-term debt issues increase with a higher term structure of the
yield curve. For example, the mean term premium is about 30bp higher for long-
term debt issues compared to short-term debt issues. In contrast, theory predicts
that a higher term premium should lead to reduced long-term debt issues in or-
der to save interest expenditures, and this behavior is documented for example by
Broner et al. (2013) for governments in emerging markets. Overall, these summary
statistics suggest that while issuer characteristics appear to influence governments’
maturity choice in line with theoretical predictions, the term structure might affect
governments’ maturity choice opposite to theoretical predictions.
[Insert Table 2 near here]
To further investigate debt issuance behavior at the government-level, Panel
A of Table 2 displays the frequencies of government debt issues across maturity
buckets at the government-level. Consistent with the aggregated results discussed
above, all governments issue the largest number of bonds in the short-term segment,
but higher indebted governments such as Belgium, Greece and Portugal issue a
relatively larger number of long-term bonds compared to lower indebted governments
such as Finland and the Netherlands. Further, governments regularly issue debt as
indicated by the high number of individual debt issues across governments. The
median (mean) annual number of debt issues is 28 (46). To condense the maturity
choice of governments at a quarterly frequency in line with governments’ interval
of maturity choice, I compute quarterly government-level shares of debt issues for
each maturity bucket. This aggregation also accounts for variations in deal amounts
across multiple debt issues within a quarter. On average, governments issue twelve
bonds per quarter, but usually do not issue debt in each maturity bucket every
quarter. Panel B of Table 2 reports the results of 3,645 government-quarter-maturity
bucket observations, of which 2,014 are comprised of at least one debt issue (and
1,631 without any debt issue). On average, 50.54% of the total issuance amount is
short-term. Also, and consistent with the larger deal amounts for long-term debt,
18.65% of the total debt issuance amount across all governments is on long-term debt
issues (compared to 7.44% of the total number of long-term debt issues). Moreover,
long-term debt issuances are clustered. On average, long-term debt issues occur
only every second quarter, but once governments issue long-term debt, one fourth
of issuance quarters contain more than half of the total quarterly debt issuance
amount. In sum, long-term debt issues are a substantial part of governments’ total
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debt issuances and vary substantially across governments and within governments
over time.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Gap-filling debt maturity choice
In this section, I empirically test for gap-filling in the government bond market. Ac-
cording to gap-filling, governments’ debt issues would fill supply gaps across matu-
rities, which result from varying aggregate government funding patterns. As argued
above, gap-filling should be more pronounced for governments long-term (greater
than ten years) debt issues, because of higher duration risk capital for arbitrageurs
and higher inelastic demand from life insurance and pension companies. The gap-
filling hypothesis is therefore that governments increase their issuance of long-term
debt following periods of low aggregate Eurozone government long-term debt is-
suance.
To test the gap-filling hypothesis, I investigate the determinants of governments’
debt issuance across different maturity buckets. Specifically, I estimate Tobit models
with the following latent variable regression
ShareIssuei,m,t =α + β1 · AMT10t−1 + β2 · TermStructure10y6mi,t−1
β3 · Y ield6mt−1 + β4 · SpreadToGermany10yi,t−1
+ γ ·Xi,t−1 + ei,m,t ∀m ∈M, (1)
where ShareIssuei,m,t is the share of debt issues of government i in quarter t in ma-
turity segment m, which can be one of the five maturity buckets introduced above
(with maturity ranges of (0,1] year, (1,3] years, (3,5] years, (5,10] years, and (10,...)
years). The Tobit models take into account that the dependent variable is bounded
between zero and one, and jointly estimates governments’ decision to issue in a spe-
cific maturity segment as well as the issuance share. The key independent variable
of interest is AMT10t−1, which is the log of the aggregated Eurozone governments’
long-term debt issue amount in the previous quarter. Consistent with the gap-filling
hypothesis and governments’ time interval of maturity choice, AMT10 is lagged by
one period and therefore predetermined in period t, which suppresses contempo-
raneous issuance adjustments. Other country-specific credit market conditions are
the slope of the government yield curve (TermStructure10y6mi,t−1), the level of
government short-term yields (Y ield6mi,t−1), and the long-term credit spread to
Germany (SpreadToGermany10yi,t−1), which are all lagged by one period consis-
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tent to governments’ time interval of maturity choice. Further, Xi,t−1 contains a
set of lagged country-level macroeconomic variables affecting governments’ current
maturity choice, such as the level of indebtedness, and the change in indebtedness
over the previous four quarters. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and
clustered at the country-level.
[Insert Table 3 near here]
Table 3 presents the set of Tobit model regression results. As shown, supply
changes in aggregated Eurozone long-term debt affect governments’ maturity choice
non-linearly. Consistent with gap-filling, the coefficient estimate for AMT10 on
long-term debt issues is negative and statistically significant at the 1%-level (see
column (5)). Also, the coefficient for AMT10 on short-term debt issues is positive
and statistically significant at the 1%-level (see column (1)), and both coefficient
estimates of AMT10 are very similar in absolute magnitude. The coefficient estimate
of AMT10 on debt issues in the remaining three maturity buckets is mostly close to
zero and not statistically significant, besides for debt issues with (3,5] year maturities
at the 10%-level. Consequently, governments engage in gap-filling by increasing long-
term debt issues following periods of low aggregate Eurozone government debt, and
vice versa.
Turning to other credit market conditions, I find that governments increase debt
issues in the three intermediate maturity buckets during periods of a high term
structure, while short-term debt issues are reduced (see columns (2)-(4)). This
finding stays in contrast to theoretical models in which governments increase short-
term issues in times of high term premia, when hedging fluctuating interest rates
with long-term debt becomes more expensive (see for example Arellano and Rama-
narayanan (2012)). An alternative explanation being consistent with my finding
is that higher term premia stipulate increased investor demand for medium-term
government debt, and governments cater this demand. Further, and consistent with
only relative prices between short-term and long-term debt affecting governments
maturity trade-off, the level of governments short-term yields does not affect short-
term and long-term debt issues. Further, higher 10-year credit risk compared to
Germany reduces governments’ long-term debt issuance (see column (5)). This find-
ing is consistent with investors reducing long-term funding to governments, when
their credit quality deteriorates relative to Germany.
Also, the effects of macroeconomic conditions are broadly in line with theory.
Consistent with theories of mitigating rollover risk, debt issues in the two matu-
rity buckets greater than five years increase with the level of indebtedness (see
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columns (4) and (5)). Similarly, long-term debt issues increase (and short-term
debt issues decrease) following positive changes in the level of governments’ indebt-
edness. Conversely, deleveraging governments reduce long-term and increase short-
term issuances, which is consistent with theories of incentivizing quicker paths to
lower government debt levels (Aguiar et al. (2016)). In sum, I find strong evidence
for governments’ gap-filling and the effects of both credit market conditions and
macroeconomic conditions are predominantly in line with theoretical predictions.
One concern of this gap-filling result might be that the dependent variable cap-
tures only the absolute share of debt issues, rather than temporary deviations. To
alleviate this concern, I estimate OLS models of governments’ debt issues across
my five maturity buckets with different fixed effects.12 For brevity, I only discuss
the results here, but report the results for short-term and long-term debt issues in
Table A. 3 in the Appendix. In the different regression specifications, I sequentially
include year, quarter, country-quarter, and country-year fixed effects to control for
unobserved (country-level) time-invariant effects such as country-level specific is-
suance pattern, or (country-level) demand trends over time. Consistent with the
Tobit model results, governments’ gap-filling behavior continues to hold under all
OLS model specifications. Specifically, the coefficient estimates of the AMT10 vari-
able for long-term debt issues are negative, very similar in magnitude across all
specifications, and also statistically significant at least at the 5%-level across all
specifications (see Panel (b)). This gap-filling effect is also economically highly sig-
nificant. A decrease from the 75th-percentile to the 25th-percentile of the AMT10
variable increases the share of governments’ long-term debt issuance by between
5.04%-points to 6.55%-points across all specifications, which compares to a mean
quarterly share of long-term debt issuance of 18.65%-points. Also consistent with the
Tobit models results, governments’ gap-filling results in a shift between long-term
and short-term debt issues. The coefficient estimates on AMT10 for short-term debt
issues are positive, similar in absolute economic magnitude than for long-term issues,
and statistically significant at least at the 1%-level (besides for the most saturated
specification being at the 5%-level) (see Panel (a)). In addition, as country-year
fixed effects control for the stock of country-level long-term debt, my gap-filling re-
sult based on the flow of new debt issues can also be interpreted to hold for the
stock of Eurozone government long-term debt. Overall, these results show the ro-
bustness of the gap-filling result and imply that governments’ gap-filling constitutes
a deviation from established debt issuance pattern.
12Even though the setup would continue to justify non-linear regression models, the incidental
parameters problem in the Tobit model (see, e.g. Greene (2004)) justifies a linear model to include
several fixed effects.
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4.2 Time-variation of gap-filling
In the previous subsection, I showed that governments engage in gap-filling debt
maturity choice. Next, I analyze variations in governments’ gap-filling over time.
The theoretical gap-filling result from GHS (2010) builds on two key ingredients for
governments’ gap-filling: (1) partially segmented bond markets, and (2) limits to
arbitrage. Partial segmentation of bond markets across maturities might have signif-
icantly increased since the start of harmonizing EU insurance regulation (Solvency
II) on November 25, 2009, which reinforced insurers’ incentive to match the maturity
of its liabilities with government bonds. These matching incentives particularly af-
fected life insurance companies’ preferred habitat for long-term government debt, as
matching the maturity of long-term liabilities is most efficient to reduce regulatory
capital requirements. With insurance companies being the largest group of institu-
tional investors in Europe with almost EUR 10 trillion of assets under management
in 2014 according to Insurance Europe, these changed incentives might have sig-
nificantly increased the segmentation of Eurozone government bond markets across
maturities. In addition, limits to arbitrage might have increased over the same pe-
riod as a result of banks reduced capitalizations due to the global financial crisis
and Eurozone crisis, and tighter financial regulation in response to these crises.
To investigate possible variations in gap-filling over time, I use the start of har-
monizing EU insurance regulation (Solvency II) as a cut-off to split the sample
periods in two subperiods. Specifically, the first subperiod covers 1999 to 2009, and
the second subperiod covers 2010 to 2015. Consistent with the gap-filling theory, I
hypothesize that governments’ gap-filling did not occur during the first subperiod
with lower inelastic demand for long-term government debt and lower limits to ar-
bitrage. Further, I conjecture that gap-filling occurred during the second subperiod
with higher inelastic demand for long-term government debt and higher limits to
arbitrage.
[Insert Table 4 near here]
Table 4 provides estimates of Tobit models for short-term (up to one year) and
long-term (greater than ten years) government debt issues for each subperiod. As
hypothesized and shown in column (2), gap-filling did not occur during the first
subperiod from 1999-2009. The coefficient estimate for AMT10 on long-term debt
issues is close to zero and statistically insignificant.13 Instead, governments reduced
long-term debt issuance, when the level of short-term funding costs increased. That
13I also do not find governments’ gap-filling in the subperiod from 2007:q2-2009:q4 covering lower
capitalization of banks during the Global financial crisis.
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is, the coefficient estimate for the six-month government yield is negative and sta-
tistically significant at the 5%-level. However, and as hypothesized, governments
engaged in gap-filling during the second subperiod from 2010-2015. The coefficient
estimate for AMT10 on long-term debt issues is negative, almost double the magni-
tude compared to results across the entire sample period, and statistically significant
at the 1%-level (see column (3)). In addition, the coefficient estimate of AMT10 on
short-term debt issues is positive and statistically significant at the 1%-level (and
the non-reported coefficient estimates of AMT10 for the three intermediate maturity
ranges are close to zero and statistically insignificant).14 Consequently, governments
engage in gap-filling by shifting between long-term and short-term debt issuances,
leaving intermediate maturity debt issues unchanged. In contrast to the first sub-
period, long-term debt issuance is not affected by changes in the level of short-term
yields. Instead, and consistent with catering investor demands, governments increase
the issuance of long-term debt, when the term premium is high. Overall, these re-
sults show that gap-filling occurred only since 2010 and appears to be driven insurers
inelastic demand for long-term government debt.
One concern might be that the gap-filling result in the 2010-2015 subperiod is
driven by interactions in maturity choice between peripheral and core governments,
for example as a result of peripheral governments reduced access to long-term fund-
ing during the Eurozone crisis. I counter this concern in two steps. First, I test
governments’ gap-filling behavior separate for core and peripheral governments over
the entire 2010 to 2015 subperiod. Second, I estimate gap-filling across all govern-
ments after the Eurozone crisis (with a sample period from 2012:q4 to 2015:q3). For
brevity, I discuss the results here and refer to Tables A. 4 and A.5 in the Appendix.
First, and similar to results for the 2010-2015 subperiod, both core and peripheral
governments engaged in gap-filling behavior in the 2010 to 2015 period. The esti-
mated coefficients on AMT10 for long-term debt issues are negative, very similar
in magnitude between peripheral and core governments, and statistically significant
at the 1%-level. Second, the gap-filling result also holds for the time-period after
the Eurozone crisis. The coefficient estimate on AMT10 for long-term debt issues
is negative, has very similar magnitude as in the other specifications and is statis-
tically significant at the 1%-level. Overall, these results confirm the robustness of
governments’ gap-filling debt maturity choice in the 2010-2015 subperiod.
14These and all the following results are robust to excluding time periods affected by the intro-
duction of the ECB’s QE program in early 2015.
17
4.3 Cross-section of gap-filling
In the previous two sub-sections, I showed that governments engage in gap-filling,
but only during the 2010-2015 subperiod. Next, I analyze for which types of gov-
ernments gap-filling is more pronounced. As discussed above, gap-filling should be
more pronounced for less financially constrained and higher rated governments. Less
financially constrained governments might engage more aggressively in gap-filling,
as they have higher flexibility to adjust the maturity structure of their debt issues
(GHS (2010)). Higher rated governments might undertake gap-filling more aggres-
sively, as investors prefer the high credit quality of government bond securities (KVJ
(2012)).
To investigate cross-sectional variations, I estimate Tobit models of governments’
long-term debt issues across different subsamples of governments in the 2010-2015
subperiod. Governments’ financial constraints are captured along five dimensions:
indebtedness, size, funding needs, budget deficit, and future economic growth. Gov-
ernments’ credit quality is measured by its S&P’s long-term local currency rating.
Sample splits are defined as equal or above median within the same quarter (or year)
in the panel of Eurozone governments, except for funding needs being defined within
a government over time as specified in Ongena et al. (2016) and budget deficits are
split above and below 3% corresponding to budget deficit limit in the Maastricht
Criteria.
[Insert Table 5 near here]
Table 5 shows estimates of Tobit models for long-term debt issues for subsam-
ples of governments sequentially split across their indebtedness, size, funding needs,
budget deficit, future economic growth, and rating. Consistent with theoretical
predictions, I find that less financially constrained governments engage more ag-
gressively in gap-filling. That is, governments’ gap-filling is more pronounced when
indebtedness is low, country size is small, funding needs are low, budget deficits are
below the Maastricht criteria, and future economic growth is high (see columns (1),
(3), (5), (7), and (9)). All coefficient estimates on AMT10 are negative, economi-
cally significant, and about three to four times (one half to one third higher than)
the magnitude for more financially constrained governments across indebtedness and
size (funding needs, budget deficit, and economic growth). These coefficient esti-
mates on AMT10 are also statistically significant at the 1%-level, expect for funding
needs at the 5%-level. Additionally, while less pronounced, gap-filling is still an im-
portant determinant of higher financially constrained governments’ maturity choice.
The coefficient estimate on AMT10 is negative, and statistically significant at least
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at the 5%-level for the subsamples of financially higher constraint governments (see
columns (2), (4), (6), (8), and (10)). Consequently, less financially constrained gov-
ernments possess a higher flexibility to issue their debt and possess a higher degree
of freedom to structure their maturity profile of their outstanding debt.
Finally, and also consistent with theory, I find more pronounced gap-filling for
higher rated governments. In the subsample of higher rated governments the coeffi-
cient estimate of AMT10 on long-term debt issues is negative, about one and a half
times the magnitude for lower rated governments, and statistically significant at the
1%-level (see column (11)). The coefficient estimate on AMT10 on long-term debt
issues for lower rated governments is also negative, and statistically significant at
the 5%-level (see column (12)). Overall, I find that gap-filling is more pronounced
for less financially constrained, and higher rated governments.
5 Event Study
Even though my government debt issuance data enables me to precisely capture
governments’ maturity choice that is consistent with gap-filling behavior, endogene-
ity problems from unobserved coordination of governments’ debt maturity choice
across countries remain. Specifically, individual governments might want to avoid
concentrated maturity profiles of aggregated Eurozone government debt to mitigate
rollover risk and limited access to capital market in case of a systematic shock to
Eurozone governments (similar to Choi et al. (forthcoming)). Under this alternative
explanation, changes in governments’ debt maturity choice would be the result of co-
ordinated supply, rather than a response to investor’s maturity-specific demand. To
address this concern, I exploit changes in peripheral governments’ maturity choice
(induced by peripheral banks’ “carry trades”) following the ECB’s three-year long-
term refinancing operations (LTRO) in 2011-2012 as a large, and largely unexpected
negative credit supply shock of long-term government debt possibly affecting core
governments maturity choice.
[Insert Figure 2 near here]
As discussed in detail below and illustrated in Figure 2, the ECB aimed to
support bank lending and market liquidity when providing its largest liquidity pro-
vision ever to mostly weakly capitalized, peripheral banks. Peripheral banks used
the ECB’s liquidity to gamble for resurrection by entering into “carry trades” that
matched the maturity of the ECB’s three-year liquidity – that is, purchasing short-
term peripheral government debt and depositing it as collateral at the ECB. As a
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response, peripheral governments increased short-term debt issuance to accommo-
date banks temporary collateral demand to mitigate their rollover risk during the
Eurozone crisis. Given unchanged total debt issuance amounts, peripheral govern-
ments’ adjustments in maturity choice induced a temporary negative credit supply
shock of long-term Eurozone government debt. The corresponding gap-filling hy-
pothesis is that core governments temporarily increased their issuance of longer
maturity debt to fill this supply gap.
A concern might be that the ECB launched its large-scale liquidity provision to
Eurozone banks to ease refinancing risks for peripheral governments during the es-
calation of the Eurozone crisis (in particular for non-EFSF/ESM program countries
Italy, and Spain). However, Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union (TFEU) prohibits the ECB from monetary financing of governments.
In addition, even if the ECB might have intended that its large-scale liquidity pro-
vision improves peripheral governments refinancing conditions, the intervention is
likely to be exogenous to core governments’ maturity choices. Further, while finan-
cial market participants might have expected that the ECB lengthens its LTRO
maturity compared to previous LTROs, the ECB’s choice of granting liquidity for
three years was still to a large degree incidental, and exogenous to core governments
maturity choices. Consequently, the ECB’s three-year LTRO constitutes a suitable
event to investigate core governments’ gap-filling behavior.
5.1 The ECB’s three-year long-term refinancing operations
As a response to funding pressures of European banks caused by their exposure
to risky Eurozone sovereign debt in the second half of 2011, the ECB announced
on December 8, 2011 two unpreceded loans to banks in its three-year long-term
refinancing operations (LTRO).15 These three-year LTROs were an addition to the
ECB’s existing lending to banks under its main refinancing operations (MRO). The
three-year LTRO’s conditions were equivalent to the ECB’s MROs, except for grant-
ing liquidity for three years.16 Specifically, the ECB’s LTRO liquidity was granted
unconditional to bank lending, the lending interest rates was floating at the MRO
rate (tied to ECB policy rate), collateral and haircut conditions were more favor-
able than in the private markets, and lending was full allotment (no borrowing
quantity limits for banks). These loan conditions were identical across all banks.
15The official ECB goal was to add “additional enhanced credit support mea-
sures to support bank lending and liquidity in the euro area money market.” See
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111208_1.en.html
16The MRO loan maturity is one week. Another type of prior ECB loans are LTRO loans with
three month maturity.
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As the ECB introduced full allotment in its MROs only in October 2008, uptake of
the ECB’s new three-year loans reduced banks uncertainty about potential future
amount limits on the ECB MROs. In addition, both three-year loans included re-
payment options after one year, so that banks had flexibility about the duration of
their ECB funding.17
Following the LTRO announcement, the ECB conducted two three-year LTRO
allotments on December 21, 2011 (LTRO1), and on February 29, 2012 (LTRO2).
Under LTRO1 523 banks borrowed EUR 489.2bn and under LTRO2 800 banks
borrowed EUR 529.5bn. Banks were allowed to substitute new liquidity with existing
ECB borrowing facilities (MROs, 3-month LTROs, 12-month LTRO18) so that in
the week of LTRO1 the net increase in borrowing was EUR 210.0bn and in the
week of LTRO2 the net increase in borrowing was EUR 310.6bn.19 Yet, despite
banks partial substitution of LTRO liquidity with existing ECB borrowing, the two
LTRO loans significantly eased banks funding pressure and considerably reduced
the uncertainty of banks funding due to the lengthened maturity. Consistent with
the ECB’s three-year LTRO being more favorable for weakly capitalized banks (see
Drechsler et al. (2016)), banks in peripheral countries picked up more than two
thirds of the total LTRO1 and LTRO2 loans.
5.2 Banks maturity-specific demand for government debt
The large-scale liquidity provision under the ECB’s three-year LTRO allowed under-
capitalized peripheral banks to gamble for resurrection by engaging in “carry trades”
(e.g. Acharya and Steffen (2015)).20 “Carry trades” constitute of purchasing high-
yielding peripheral government debt funded by cheap ECB funding, and depositing
these peripheral government debt as collateral at the ECB. Purchasing bonds for
“carry trades” with maturities of up to three years were particularly attractive to
17Banks aggregate repayments from January 25, 2013 to June 27, 2013 added up to
205.8bn EUR (101.7bn EUR) for the first (second) three-year LTRO, which is consistent
to a substantial part of banks “carry trades” being conducted with short-term (up to
one year) peripheral government debt issues. These debt issues accounted for the largest
share of peripheral governments’ debt issuance adjustments following the ECB’s three-
year LTRO as discussed in subsection 5.3 below. For details on LTRO repayments see
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/mb201307_focus04.en.pdf?33a710426a010fe7968e0adb8a012839
18The ECB allotted 3-month LTROs in April 2010, May 2010, and August 2011, and a 12-month
LTRO in October 2011. Banks were allowed to switch liquidity from the 12-month LTRO with the
three-year LTRO1 liquidity and shifted EUR 45.7bn.
19See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/pdf/mb201203en_box3.pdf?08c66bbcc045b15e9ae0e7038518274d
20Peripheral banks’ exposure to its domestic sovereign debt during the Eurozone crisis also
increased due to “moral suasion” (see for example Ongena et al. (2016), and Altavilla et al. (2017)).
However, the “moral suasion” channel - in comparison to the “carry trade” channel - is independent
from the maturity structure of government bond purchases by banks.
21
banks, as these matched the ECB funding maturity and consequently reduced banks
liquidity and market risk (Crosignani et al. (2017)). While the yield spread on the
“carry trades” was identical across all banks, incentives to engage in “carry trades”
were very different between weakly capitalized banks in peripheral Eurozone coun-
tries and well-capitalized banks in core Eurozone countries. For weakly capitalized
banks in peripheral Eurozone countries these “carry trades” were particularly at-
tractive, as under-capitalized banks did not bear the entire downside risk of the
trade due to the limited liability of equity. In addition, peripheral banks purchases
of domestic peripheral government debt increased sovereign-bank linkages and con-
sequently raised the likelihood of domestic bailouts of the banking system (Farhi and
Tirole (forthcoming)). Consequently, “carry trades” allowed weakly capitalized pe-
ripheral banks to gamble for resurrection. In contrast, well-capitalized banks in core
Eurozone countries were fully exposed to the downside risk of “carry trades” and
their exposure to peripheral government debt did not affect their domestic bailout
probability.
[Insert Table 6 near here]
Table 6 reports country-level holdings of banks peripheral government debt hold-
ings before and after the inception of the ECB’s three-year LTRO. Changes in banks’
peripheral government debt holdings between December 2011 and June 2012 are
consistent with the above described asymmetric incentives for under-capitalized pe-
ripheral and well-capitalized core banks. Specifically, banks in peripheral Eurozone
countries increased their holdings of GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain) government debt (see also Crosignani et al. (2017)), while banks in core Eu-
rozone countries reduced their holdings of GIIPS government debt. Also, increases
by banks in peripheral countries are larger by a factor of six compared to decreases of
banks in core countries, indicating that Eurozone banks in aggregate increased their
demand for peripheral government debt. Consistent with peripheral banks “carry
trades” demand, banks in peripheral Eurozone countries particularly increased their
holdings of GIIPS government debt up to three years, while banks in core Eurozone
countries reduced GIIPS government debt holdings similarly across maturities.
[Insert Figure 3 near here]
Further, changes in the slope of peripheral governments’ yield curves following
the announcement of the ECB’s three-year LTRO are also consistent with a sharp
increase in demand for shorter maturity peripheral government debt (see Figure 3,
Panel A). The term premium – that is the difference between the 10-year yield
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and the 1-year yield – increased between the announcement of the ECB’s three-
year LTRO on December 8, 2011 and the second allotment on February 29, 2012
by 320bps for Italy, and 274bps for Spain, mainly resulting from reductions of the
1-year yield. Overall, both changes in banks holdings of peripheral government
debt and changes in the slope of peripheral government yield curves following the
announcement of the ECB’s three-year LTRO indicate a large, and sudden increase
in demand for short-term peripheral government debt.
[Insert Figure 4 near here]
In contrast, relative demand changes across maturities for Eurozone core gov-
ernments rotated oppositely after the announcement of the ECB’s three-year LTRO
– indicating a sudden increase in the demand for longer maturity core government
debt. Specifically, the term premia for core governments decreased between Decem-
ber 8, 2011 and February 29, 2012 – for example by 28bps for Germany, and 18bps
for France – and continued to decline until the ECB president Draghi’s “whatever
it takes speech” on July 26, 2012 to a total of 72bps for Germany, and 57bps for
France (see Figure 3, Panel B). In addition, rotating demand across maturities for
core government debt is also observed in core governments’ debt auctions. Excess
demand (measured in the bid-to-cover ratio) in government debt auctions decreased
for shorter maturities and increased for longer maturities for Germany and France
during the LTRO-period (see Figure 4). In sum, after the announcement of the
ECB’s three-year LTRO demand for longer maturity core government debt increased
significantly.
5.3 Governments’ supply response
Next, I examine governments’ response in their maturity choice of debt issues to
the these changes in investor’s maturity-specific demand for peripheral and core
Eurozone government debt following the announcement of the ECB’s three-year
LTRO. As I will show below, peripheral governments accommodated peripheral
banks “carry trade” demand for shorter debt maturities by reducing the supply of
long-term debt. The corresponding gap-filling hypothesis is that core governments
responded to this negative credit supply shock of long-term Eurozone government
debt by filling the gap of longer maturity government debt.
[Insert Figure 5 near here]
In a first step, I analyze aggregate changes in the maturity structure of periph-
eral and core governments’ debt issues in response to the ECB’s three-year LTRO.
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Therefore, I compute the average maturity of all debt issues for both peripheral and
core governments over time by weighting individual debt maturities by their notional
issuance amount denominated in euro. Figure 5 shows that the average maturity of
debt issues of peripheral and core governments shows a parallel trend before and af-
ter the LTRO-period, with core governments issuing debt with slightly shorter debt
maturity compared to peripheral governments. However, during the LTRO-period
the average maturity of debt issues diverged between peripheral and core govern-
ments. Consistent with peripheral governments accommodating peripheral banks
demand for “carry trades”, peripheral governments reduced their maturity of debt
issues by 0.8 years to 2.6 years in the LTRO-period. Consistent with core govern-
ments’ gap-filling of longer maturity government debt, core governments increased
their average maturity of debt issues by 2.2 years to 5.1 years in the LTRO-period.
This rotation of peripheral and core governments’ maturity structure of debt
issues is also observed when analyzing the fraction of debt issues with maturities
above three years over time (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). Further and consistent
my gap-filling results above, core governments decreased short-term (up to one year)
debt issues to fill the gap of longer maturity government debt (see Figure A. 2 in
the Appendix).
In a second step, I investigate peripheral and core governments’ maturity choices
following the ECB’s three-year LTRO in a regression setting. The baseline form of
the regression I estimate is as follows:
ShareIssuei,m,t = β1 · (Peripherali · LTROt) + β2 · (Corei · LTROt)
+ γ ·Xi,m,t + ei,m,t ∀m ∈M (2)
The dependent variable ShareIssuei,m,t is the share of debt issues of government i in
quarter t and maturity segment m, which can either be up to three years or greater
than three years. These two maturity buckets are aligned according to the maturity
of the ECB’s three-year LTRO to reflect banks incentive to mitigate liquidity risk.
The two key interaction terms in the regression are (Peripherali · LTROt) and
(Corei · LTROt). Peripherali is an indicator variable equal to one if government
i is a peripheral government, and Corei is an indicator variable equal to one if
government i is a core government. LTROt is an indicator variable equal to one
if quarter t falls into the LTRO-period from 2012:q1 to 2012:q3. To ensure that
peripheral governments’ maturity choices are not affected by exclusion from capital
markets and ongoing ESM-programs, I restrict peripheral governments to Italy and
Spain. Core governments are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the
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Netherlands, and the sample period is 2010:q1 to 2014:q3.21 I further sequentially
include different fixed effects, such as country, country-maturity, country-quarter,
and maturity-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust
and clustered at the government level.
[Insert Table 7 near here]
Table 7 reports the regression results. In all specifications, I find economically
and at the 1%-level statistically significant coefficient estimates for changes of pe-
ripheral and core governments’ maturity choices during the LTRO-period. That is,
consistent with accommodating peripheral banks “carry trade” demand, peripheral
governments increased their share of debt issues up to three years by 19.9%-points
in the LTRO-period (the average share of debt issues up to three years is 52.3% out-
side the LTRO-period) (see column (1)). Correspondingly, peripheral governments’
share of debt issues with maturities greater than three years reduced by 19.9% (see
column (2)). Consistent with gap-filling, core governments increased their share of
debt issues above three years by 14.5%-points in the LTRO-period (see column (2)).
These maturity adjustments by core governments are equivalent to an increase of
44.8%, when compared to the mean share of debt issues greater than three years
of 32.4%-points outside the LTRO-period. These regression results are also robust
to sequentially including two-way fixed effects of country, maturity, and quarter.22
Overall, this event study shows that core governments’ gap-filling of longer maturity
debt is a response to investor’s maturity-specific demand for government debt.
5.4 Financial implications of governments’ supply response
The results above indicate that both peripheral and core Eurozone governments
significantly altered their maturity structure of debt issues following the ECB’s
three-year LTRO. In this sub-section, I investigate the financial implications of these
temporary maturity adjustments. Specifically, I focus government debt managers’
primary maturity trade-off between funding needs and funding costs.
[Insert Figure 6 near here]
21This sample period is aligned to the gap-filling subperiod 4.2, but excludes periods affected
by the introduction of the ECB’s Q.E. program. The results shown below are robust to extending
the sample period until 2015:q3.
22The results are also robust to analyzing governments’ debt maturity choice at a monthly,
or yearly frequency, and aggregating debt issues at the government-level in the pre-LTRO- and
LTRO-period as suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004).
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Figure 6 reveals that peripheral and core governments’ temporary maturity ad-
justments following the ECB’s three-year LTRO lead to a permanent effect on their
overall debt maturity structures. The average residual maturity of total outstanding
debt increased from 7.1 to 7.3 years across core governments and decreased from 6.8
to 6.4 years across peripheral governments from December 31, 2011 to September
30, 2012, while the average residual maturities show a parallel trend both before and
after the LTRO-period. These maturity adjustments resulted in core governments’
debt portfolios becoming less fragile due to lower future rollover requirements, while
peripheral governments’ debt portfolios became more fragile due to higher future
rollover requirements.
To illustrate the effects on individual governments’ debt rollover requirements, I
next plot each government’s debt maturity profile as at December 31, 2012. Therein,
I highlight changes resulting from the introduction of the ECB’s three-year LTRO.
To compute the counterfactual – the debt maturity profile without the ECB’s three-
year LTRO effect –, I take a government’s debt maturity profile as at December 31,
2011, and rescale the amount of debt issues in the LTRO-period to the maturity-
bucket specific average share of debt issues from 2010 and 2011. The difference
between the actual and counterfactual debt maturity profile is highlighted as the
ECB’s three-year LTRO effect.
[Insert Figure 7 near here]
Consistent with changes to the average residual maturity of total outstanding
debt, I find that debt maturity profiles of peripheral governments shifted towards
shorter maturities. In contrast, debt maturity profiles of core governments shifted
towards long-term maturities. As shown in Figure 7, total debt rollover requirements
until 2016 increased by 51.4bn EUR (or 3.3% of 2012 GDP) for Italy and 49.1bn
EUR (4.7% of 2012 GDP) for Spain due to the ECB’s three-year LTRO effect. Cor-
respondingly, debt rollover requirements particularly for long-term debt (maturing
after 2021) significantly reduced for Italy (30.1bn EUR) and Spain (50.0bn EUR).
As shorter maturity debt is usually rolled over into debt with similar maturities, pe-
ripheral governments’ debt rollover requirements are likely to increase also beyond
2016.
Consistent with gap-filling, debt maturity profiles of core governments’ show
that their increased debt issuance with maturities after 2021 filled the gap left by
peripheral governments. In total, core governments increased their outstanding
debt maturing after 2021 by 74.2bn EUR (or 1.1% of aggregated core governments
2012 GDP). Consequently, core government’s gap-filling was almost euro-for-euro,
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replacing 93% (74.2bn EUR out of 80.1bn EUR) of the reduced long-term debt
issuance by peripheral governments. Consistent with the gap-filling results across
the longer time period above, core governments mainly reduced short-term debt
issues maturing in 2013 by -52.6bn EUR (or -0.84% of aggregated core governments
2012 GDP).
Consistent with the cross-sectional results above, gap-filling was more pronounced
for less financially constrained and higher rated governments. Finland as a AAA-
rated, small, and lowly indebted country engaged most aggressively in gap-filling,
increasing long-term debt issues maturing after 2021 by 4.2% of GDP. Austria as
a AA+-rated, small, and then similarly indebted country as France and Germany
increased long-term debt issues maturing after 2021 by 3.1% of GDP (compared to
0.8% of France (AA+-rated), and 0.9% of Germany (AAA-rated)). In sum, core
governments’ gap-filling lead to a permanent prolongation of their debt maturity
profiles and consequently reduced future debt rollover requirements – particularly
for less financially constrained and higher rated governments.
Finally, I investigate the effect of governments’ adjusted debt maturity structure
on governments funding costs. As yield curves were upward sloping in the LTRO-
period (see Figure 3), peripheral governments might have significantly reduced their
funding costs by increasing their issuance of shorter debt maturities. In contrast,
core governments might have only possessed the ability to fill the gap of long-term
bonds due to their capacity to pay higher funding costs.
Based on the same assumptions as for computing a governments’ debt maturity
profile without the ECB’s three-year LTRO effect above, I also compute the resulting
changes in governments’ funding costs due to their maturity adjustments in the
LTRO-period. My analysis reveals that core governments’ gap-filling increased their
funding costs by just 0.1bn EUR to 0.4bn EUR in 2012 (or between 0.01% to 0.12%
of a core government’s GDP), which compares to an average core government budget
deficit of 2.9%. Consequently, core governments permanently lengthened their debt
maturity profiles and reduced future debt rollover requirements at relatively low
additional costs. Peripheral governments shift to shorter debt maturities reduced
the funding costs for Italy and Spain by 1.1bn EUR (or 0.07% of GDP) and 0.5bn
EUR (0.05% of GDP) in 2012, respectively. These funding costs reductions are
also very small when compared to the Italy’s and Spain’s 2012 budget deficits of
2.9% and 10.4% of GDP, respectively. In sum, this evidence on changes in funding
needs and funding costs is consistent with peripheral governments’ main motive to
adjust their debt maturity structure following the ECB’s three-year LTRO being
a temporary relief on debt rollover during the Eurozone crisis, despite its negative
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implications for future debt rollover requirements.
5.5 Robustness
Placebo test: ECB’s first targeted long-term refinancing operation
A major concern of employing the ECB’s three-year LTRO in 2011-2012 as an
event study to investigate governments’ gap-filling behavior might be confounding
events during the Eurozone crisis. To alleviate this concern, I perform a placebo
test based on another large-scale ECB liquidity provision dated after the Eurozone
crisis. Specifically, I exploit the introduction of the ECB’s first target long-term
refinancing operations (TLTRO1) announced on June 5, 2014. The TLTRO1 inter-
vention was very similar to the three-year LTRO, besides making liquidity provisions
to banks conditional to bank lending.23 This conditionality consequently also pro-
hibited banks to use ECB liquidity for “carry trades”, which induced peripheral gov-
ernments to accommodate demand for shorter maturity peripheral government debt
and subsequently led to core governments gap-filling following the ECB’s three-year
LTRO in 2011-2012. Another important difference is that in 2014 peripheral banks
had a much higher level of capitalization, so that they would have been fully exposed
to the downside risk of the “carry trades” compared limited downside risk follow-
ing the three-year LTRO in 2011-2012. In addition, in 2014 peripheral sovereigns
were more resilient compared to 2011-2012 so that increased bank-sovereign linkages
would not have affected banks domestic bailout probability. In sum, the conditions
that induced peripheral banks to engage in “carry trades” in 2011-2012 were largely
eliminated by mid-2014. Consequently, I hypothesize that (peripheral) banks did
not alter their demand for shorter maturity peripheral government debt following the
inception of the TLTRO1 so that both peripherla and core Eurozone governments’
maturity choices remained unaffected by the introduction of the TLTRO1.
Liquidity provisions under the ECB’s TLTRO1 were allotted on eight allotments
dates between September 24, 2014 to June 29, 2016, with the majority of the liquidity
injection (384.1bn EUR out of 432.0bn EUR, or 88.9%) being allotted in the first
four allotments until June 24, 2015.24 All liquidity provisions matured on September
26, 2018 so that the loan maturity for the first four allotments amounted to four, or
slighly below four years. Correspondingly, I use four years as the maturity cut-off
between shorter and longer maturity debt and 2014:q4 to 2015:q3 as the TLTRO1-
period (and a sample period from 2010:q1 to 2015:q3) for the placebo test.
[Insert Table 8 near here]
23See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140605_2.en.html
24See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omo/html/index.en.html
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Table 8 reports estimation results and shows that following the inception of the
ECB’s TLTRO1 program both peripheral and core governments maturity choice re-
mained unchanged. Specifically, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients on the
TLTRO1-period are close to zero and statistically insignificant for both peripheral
and core governments’ shorter and longer maturity debt issues (see columns (1),
and (2)). These results also continue to hold when controlling for two-way fixed
effects of country, maturity, and quarter. Correspondingly, liquidity allotments un-
der the ECB’s TLTRO1 did not affect peripheral and core governments maturity
choices. Overall, this placebo test provides evidence that the ECB’s three-year
LTRO in 2011-2012 led to peripheral banks “carry trades”, which resulted in pe-
ripheral governments accommodating their demand for shorter maturity debt and
core governments to fill the gap of longer maturity debt.
Restricted maturity choices for peripheral governments?
Another possible concern might be that investors restricted peripheral govern-
ments access to the longer maturity bond market by reducing their demand. Con-
sequently, investors might have instead directly demanded core governments’ longer
maturity debt, rather than core governments filling the gap of longer maturity Eu-
rozone government bonds.
Different pieces of evidence reject this concern. First, my analysis is restricted
to Italy and Spain as peripheral governments, which had continuous access to the
(longer maturity) bond market throughout the Eurozone crisis (compared to Greece,
Ireland, and Portugal, which were partially excluded from financial markets). Sec-
ond, during the LTRO-period, Italy and Spain issued on average 27.6% of their
debt above three years every quarter, indicating that a substantial share of debt
was refinanced with longer maturities. Third, excess demand for Italian and Span-
ish longer maturity bond auctions during the LTRO-period increased compared to
the pre-LTRO period - indicating that investor’s demand for long-term peripheral
government debt remained unserved (see Figure 8). In sum, this evidence indicates
that in the LTRO-period Italian and Spanish longer maturity debt issues were not
restricted by investors.
[Insert Figure 8 near here]
Demand for safe assets
Another possible concern might be that investors demanded safe Eurozone gov-
ernment long-term assets during the acceleration of the Eurozone crisis. Conse-
quently, investors might have predominantly demanded long-term government debt
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of Germany - rather than across all core governments - due to its relative safety, size
and liquidity (He et al. (2016a), and He et al. (2016b)). Then, Germany’s provision
of safe long-term assets – rather than core governments’ gap-filling – would have led
to increased provision of long-term debt by core governments.
Different pieces of evidence reject this concern. First, investors increased their
demand for longer maturity government debt similarly across all core governments,
rather than exclusively for Germany. Yield curves for all core governments con-
tinuously flattened after the announcement of the ECB’s three-year LTRO (see
Figure 3), and increases in excess demand in longer maturity debt auctions were
similar in France compared to Germany (see Figure 4). Second, all core govern-
ments – rather than exclusively Germany – increased their issuance of long-term
debt in the LTRO-period (see Figute 7). Relative increases in the provision of long-
term debt were even larger for Austria and Finland compared to Germany. These
graphical observations are also confirmed in regression analyses, when estimating
core governments gap-filling in the LTRO-period excluding Germany (see Table A.6
in the Appendix). The estimated regression coefficients for core governments in-
crease in longer maturity debt issuance in the LTRO-period is almost identical in
magnitude compared to the regression specification including Germany and statis-
tically significant at the 5%-level. Overall, different pieces of evidence reject that
demand for safe asset as the underlying channel for core governments increased pro-
vision of long-term government debt in the LTRO-period.
Deviations from debt issuance announcements
A final concern might be that observed changes in the maturity structure of
debt issues following the three-year LTRO might have been the result of intended
supply adjustments, rather than government’s response to changes in investors’
maturity-specific demand. To alleviate this concern, I analyze deviations between
governments’ announced and realized debt auctions. Based on expected demand
by investors, governments publicly announce their planned future debt auctions.
Nevertheless, governments also publicly communicate that they maintain the flexi-
bility to deviate from their debt issuance announcements, if refinancing requirements
or market conditions change. Consequently, deviations between governments’ an-
nounced and realized debt auctions following the three-year LTRO identify supply
adjustments caused by unexpected changes in investors’ maturity-specific demand.
To compute deviations between governments’ announced and realized debt auc-
tions, I hand-collect data on debt auction announcements from Italy and Germany
between 2010:Q1 and 2014:Q3. Representing both peripheral and core Eurozone
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governments, both countries frequently issue debt across the maturity spectrum and
publicly provide detailed debt auction announcements around the ECB’s three-year
LTRO.25 To obtain a matched data set of announced and realized debt auctions, I
map announced debt auctions (via ISIN, auction date, and maturity date) to the
corresponding realized debt auction. Then, I compute auction-level measures that
relate realized debt auction amounts to announced amounts. Specifically, I compute
the realized debt auction amount relative to the announced debt issues’ minimum fi-
nal outstanding amount for Italy, and relative to the announced debt auction target
amount for Germany. Supply changes caused by investors changed maturity-specific
demand are then identified based on realized debt auctions during the LTRO-period
that were announced prior to the inception of the three-year LTRO. Consistent to
the findings above, I hypothesize that Italy reduced issuance amounts of longer ma-
turity debt auctions during the LTRO-period, while Germany increased issuance
amounts of longer maturity debt auctions to fill the gap.
[Insert Table 9 near here]
Table 9 provides evidence that peripheral governments catered investors’ “carry
trade” demand for shorter term maturities following the ECB’s three-year LTRO and
core governments filling the gap of longer maturity government debt. Italy reduced
the amount of each longer maturity debt auctions by on average 11.07% (or EUR
1,220mn) of the announced minimum final outstanding debt issuance amount in the
LTRO-period (column (2)). With a mean longer maturity debt auction amount of
EUR 2,912mn, this adjustment is economically highly significant, and also statis-
tically significant at the 1%-level. (The issuance amount of shorter maturity debt
auctions also reduced, but fewer than for longer maturity debt auctions, while at
the same time their frequency increased.) Further, Germany filled the gap of longer
maturity Eurozone government debt by deviating from its debt issuance announce-
ments. Specifically, Germany increased the amount of each longer maturity debt
auction by on average 7.71% (or EUR 356mn) of the announced target amount in
the LTRO-period (column (4)). With a mean longer maturity debt auction amount
of EUR 3,710mn, his adjustment is economically highly significant, and also statisti-
cally significant at the 1%-level. Also, increases in debt auction amounts compared
to pre-announced target amounts occurred exclusively for longer maturity bond
auctions in the LTRO-period. Overall, these results investigating governments’ de-
25Italy announces minimum final outstanding amounts of individual debt issues that are com-
prised of multiple debt auctions, while Germany announces target amounts of each individual debt
auction.
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viations between announced and realized debt auctions are consistent to my previous
findings and strengthen the identification of governments’ gap-filling behavior.
6 Conclusion and policy implications
In this paper, I investigate whether gap-filling is also an important determinant of
maturity choice in the government bond market. Consistent with gap-filling, I find
that governments increase long-term debt issues following periods of low aggregate
Eurozone government long-term debt issuance, and vice versa. This gap-filling be-
havior is more pronounced for (1) less financially constrained and (2) higher rated
governments. I address endogeneity concerns in an event study using the ECB’s
three-year LTRO, and show that core governments filled supply gaps of longer ma-
turity debt resulting from peripheral governments accommodating peripheral banks
short-term debt demand for “carry trades”. These maturity adjustments perma-
nently stabilized core governments’ debt portfolios, while it permanently increased
the fragility of peripheral governments’ debt portfolios.
My empirical findings have two important policy implications. First, Euro-
zone governments act as macro-liquidity providers across maturities, thereby pro-
viding significant risk absorption capacity to government bond markets. There is a
widespread concern about deteriorated resilience in government bond market liquid-
ity since the global financial crisis.26 In contrast, governments’ gap-filling behavior
strengthens the resilience of government bond market liquidity. As ensuring market
liquidity is important for the stability of the financial system and the transmission of
monetary policy, governments’ gap-filling might ultimately contribute to facilitating
investments and economic growth in the real economy. Consequently, changes to the
financial architecture, such as the creation of a safe government asset and the setup
of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism in the Eurozone, should be designed
such that governments continue to be able to provide this risk absorption capacity.
Second, the gap-filling result from my event study of the ECB’s three-year LTRO
provides evidence for the interaction of unconventional monetary and fiscal policy.
Specifically, ECB’s large-scale liquidity provision to banks led Eurozone governments
to adjust their maturity choices, which heterogeneously affected the stability of
core and peripheral governments’ debt portfolios. Consequently, being aware of
governments’ strategic debt issuance responses to central banks’ interventions in
government bond markets might help to avoid unintended consequences of central
26See, for example, BIS (2016), ESRB (2016), and the testimony of the Federal Reserve System
by Governor Jerome Powell (2016).
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bank interventions. Currently, these considerations appear of particular relevance
for the discussion on the size and purpose of central banks asset holdings,27 as well
as central banks decisions on reducing their asset holdings, or tapering quantitative
easing programs.
GHS (2010): Greenwood et al. (2010), KVJ (2010): Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)
27For example, Greenwood et al. (2016) suggest that the Fed should permanently use its balance
sheet to provide ample supply of government-provided short-term, safe instruments to improve
financial stability.
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Figure 1: Aggregated Eurozone Government Long-Term Debt Issue Amounts
This figure shows the aggregated debt issuance amounts of long-term debt issues by Eurozone
governments from 1999:q1 to 2015:q3. Long-term debt issues have maturities greater than ten
years. Foreign currency debt issuance amounts have been converted to euro.
Figure 1: Eurozone Government Long-Term Debt Issues
This figure shows the aggregated debt issuance amounts of long-term de t issues by Eurozone
governments from 1999:q1 to 2015:q3. Foreign currency debt issuance amounts have been converted
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Figure 2: ECB’s 3-Year LTRO as Negative Credit Supply Shock of Long-Term Debt
This figure illustrates the channels though which the ECB’s three-year LTRO induced a negative
credit supply shock to long-term Eurozone government debt.
ECB PeripheralBanks
Peripheral 
Governments
Core 
Governments
Liquidity provision
(stabilize banking system)
Demand short-term debt
(gamble for resurrection)
Reduce long-term debt
(neg. credit supply shock)
Provide short-term debt
(mitigate rollover risk)
Deposit collateral
(pass on low credit quality)
?
Gap-filling
(accommodate inelastic demand)
38
Figure 3: Changes in Government Yield Curves after the ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This figure shows snapshots from sovereign yields of peripheral and core governments at four points
in time: December 8, 2011 (the announcement day of ECB’s three-year LTRO), December 21, 2011
and February 29, 2012 (the two allotment days of the ECB’s three-year LTRO), and July 26, 2012
(the day of ECB president Draghi’s “whatever it takes” speech). The yield curves show yields of
different maturities, ranging from three months to 10 years. Panel A shows the yields for peripheral
countries, and Panel B for core countries. Yield data is obtained from Bloomberg.
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Figure 4: Excess Demand for Core Government Bonds Around ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This figure shows six-month moving averages of selected core governments bid-to-cover ratios of
governments debt auctions of different maturities. The bid-to-cover ratio of an individual debt
auction is computed as the aggregated bid amount over the total issuance amount. Selected core
governments are France and Germany. Shorter maturity debt auctions have maturities of 0.5 years,
and 1 year. Longer maturity debt auctions have maturities of 5 years, and 10 years. The grey
shaded area depicts the LTRO-period from 2012:q1 to 2012:q3.
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Figure 5: Avg. Maturity of Government Debt Issues Around ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This figure depicts the average maturity of debt issues by government groups around the ECB’s
three-year LTRO over time. The sample of governments is split into peripheral and core govern-
ments. The average maturity is computed as the mean of debt issues across all governments of the
respective group. The grey shaded area depicts the LTRO-period from 2012:q1 to 2012:q3.
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Figure 6: Avg. Residual Maturity of Outstanding Debt Around ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This figure shows the average residual maturity of outstanding debt around the ECB’s three-year
LTRO between December 31, 2010 and September 30, 2014. The sample of governments is split
into peripheral and core Eurozone governments. The average residual maturity of outstanding debt
is computed based on the residual maturity of all outstanding government bonds of a government
group at a time, weighted by the bonds notional amount. The grey shaded area depicts the
LTRO-period (2012:q1-2012:q3).
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
A
ve
ra
ge
 R
es
id
ua
l M
at
ur
ity
 o
f O
ut
st
an
di
ng
 D
eb
t
Dez 2010 Dez 2011 Dez 2012 Dez 2013
Core Eurozone Peripheral Eurozone
42
Figure 7: Debt Maturity Profiles and the ECB’s 3-Year LTRO Effect
This figure shows the debt maturity profiles of Eurozone governments as at December 31, 2012.
The changes resulting governments adjusted maturity choices following the introduction of the
ECB’s three-year LTRO are highlighted in black. To compute the counterfactual – that is the debt
maturity profile without the ECB’s three-year LTRO effect –, I take a government’s debt maturity
profile as at December 31, 2011, and rescale the amount of bond issues in the LTRO-period to the
maturity-bucket specific average from the years 2010 and 2011.The difference between the actual
and counterfactual debt maturity profile is highlighted as the ECB’s three-year LTRO effect. Panel
A shows peripheral governments, and Panel B shows core governments.
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Figure 8: Excess Demand for Peripheral Gov. Bonds Around ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This figure shows six-month moving averages of two peripheral governments bid-to-cover ratios of
governments longer maturity debt auctions. The bid-to-cover ratio of an individual debt auction
is computed as the aggregated bid amount over the total issuance amount. The two peripheral
governments are Italy and Spain. Bid-to-cover ratios of longer maturity debt auctions for maturities
of 5 and 10 years are shown. The grey shaded area depicts the LTRO-period from 2012:q1 to
2012:q3.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Maturity of Issue, 1999-2015
This table reports issuance-level summary statistics across the five different maturity buckets. The sample consists of all central government debt issuances
by 15 Eurozone governments between 1999:q1 (or their year of joining the Eurozone) and 2015:q3 and is obtained from Bloomberg. Panel A reports
summary statistics of individual debt issues. Panel B displays summary statistics of the issuing government at the time of issuance. Panel C reports credit
market conditions of the government at the time of issuance.
(0,1] Years (1,3] Years (3,5] Years (5,10] Years (10,...) Years
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
Panel A: Deal Characteristics
Years to Final Maturity 0.428 0.256 6,406 1.802 1.914 754 4.121 4.441 533 7.067 6.995 728 16.361 11.455 677
Deal Amount 2.052 0.192 6,406 4.985 2.284 754 3.695 0.728 533 4.359 0.240 728 8.194 2.480 677
Euro Denomination Dummy 0.688 1.000 6,406 0.786 1.000 754 0.636 1.000 533 0.777 1.000 728 0.873 1.000 677
Zero/Fixed Coupon Dummy 0.944 1.000 6,406 0.786 1.000 754 0.707 1.000 533 0.647 1.000 728 0.705 1.000 677
Not Inflation Linked Dummy 1.000 1.000 6,406 1.000 1.000 754 0.979 1.000 533 0.897 1.000 728 0.925 1.000 677
Repayment at Maturity Dummy 0.983 1.000 6,406 0.979 1.000 754 0.977 1.000 533 0.949 1.000 728 0.948 1.000 677
Panel B: Issuer Characteristics
Non-IG Rating Dummy 0.017 0.000 6,341 0.004 0.000 747 0.002 0.000 533 0.011 0.000 723 0.007 0.000 667
Recession Dummy 0.122 0.000 6,406 0.155 0.000 754 0.182 0.000 533 0.115 0.000 728 0.093 0.000 677
Total GDP 4Q Growth -0.002 -0.060 6,406 -0.342 -0.081 754 -1.066 -0.907 533 -0.323 -0.275 728 -0.067 -0.181 677
Inflation 1.875 1.868 6,406 2.251 2.239 754 2.136 2.230 533 1.914 1.953 728 1.795 1.932 677
Debt/GDP Ratio 0.548 0.524 6,406 0.530 0.471 754 0.554 0.498 533 0.565 0.524 728 0.611 0.587 677
Total Debt/GDP 4Q Change 0.030 0.024 6,389 0.027 0.017 753 0.041 0.031 532 0.030 0.023 727 0.028 0.022 675
Panel C: Market Characteristics
AMT10 4.207 4.286 6,333 4.154 4.233 733 4.208 4.286 526 4.207 4.333 718 4.138 4.245 653
Termstructure 10y-6m 1.595 1.655 5,625 1.738 1.740 725 2.103 2.088 501 1.898 1.951 665 1.895 1.951 592
Yield 6m 2.613 2.744 5,625 2.793 3.010 725 2.226 2.133 501 2.404 2.143 665 2.067 2.138 592
Spread to Germany 10y 0.395 0.209 5,625 0.677 0.264 725 0.783 0.277 501 0.551 0.207 665 0.590 0.248 592
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Table 2: Maturities by Government, 1999-2015
This table reports the distribution of debt issues by government and across maturity buckets.
Panel A presents the frequencies of individual debt issues across 15 Eurozone governments between
1999:q1 (or their year of joining the Eurozone) and 2015:q3, which are obtained from Bloomberg.
Panel B displays the mean quarterly share of debt issues across governments, which is computed
based on the aggregation of individual debt issues’ deal amounts within a government-quarter.
(0,1] Years (1,3] Years (3,5] Years (5,10] Years (10,...) Years Total
Panel A: Frequencies of Individual Debt Issues
Austria 2,573 50 32 62 59 2,776
Belgium 227 29 56 102 76 490
Cyprus 115 5 9 9 2 140
Finland 368 41 40 25 15 489
France 1,186 67 47 168 105 1,573
Germany 249 67 12 46 46 420
Greece 93 3 18 22 34 170
Ireland 25 1 3 5 11 45
Italy 492 154 84 84 127 941
Malta 581 3 14 42 57 697
Netherlands 212 14 14 12 25 277
Portugal 43 13 5 9 19 89
Slovakia 12 2 5 13 12 44
Slovenia 119 7 7 9 8 150
Spain 111 298 187 120 81 797
Total 6,406 754 533 728 677 9,098
Panel B: Share of Debt Issues (quarterly, in percent)
Austria 60.13 5.07 2.99 12.13 19.68 100.00
Belgium 66.34 8.07 1.97 6.35 17.28 100.00
Cyprus 67.87 5.75 19.44 6.43 0.51 100.00
Finland 56.09 5.61 10.03 12.83 15.45 100.00
France 67.00 4.96 3.47 7.90 16.68 100.00
Germany 30.97 26.53 3.39 18.26 20.86 100.00
Greece 31.88 2.91 16.09 19.91 29.21 100.00
Ireland 29.07 5.56 5.31 17.72 42.35 100.00
Italy 45.39 19.55 9.58 10.65 14.82 100.00
Malta 58.14 0.70 3.75 13.50 23.91 100.00
Netherlands 71.44 6.49 5.60 6.88 9.59 100.00
Portugal 44.67 11.62 4.18 12.12 27.41 100.00
Slovakia 30.03 1.14 9.83 29.63 29.36 100.00
Slovenia 56.42 9.35 7.11 10.71 16.41 100.00
Spain 18.70 36.08 12.50 12.49 20.23 100.00
Total 50.54 11.87 6.96 11.99 18.65 100.00
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Table 3: Gap-Filling Government Debt Maturity Choice, 1999-2015
This table reports Tobit model regression results of governments share of debt issues across five
maturity segments, on lagged AMT10 and control variables. The data sample is based on gov-
ernments individual debt issues from 1999:q1 to 2015:q3 and is obtained from Bloomberg. The
dependent variable is a governments’ share of debt issues in a maturity segments (0,1], (1,3], (3,5],
(5,10], and (10,...) years in a given quarter. The share of debt issues is computed as the aggregated
issuance amount in the respective maturity segment over the total issue amount across maturity
segments within a quarter. The Tobit model accounts for the share of debt issues being bounded
between zero and one. AMT10 is the log of the aggregated amount of long-term (above 10 years)
Eurozone government debt issues. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0,1] Y (1,3] Y (3,5] Y (5,10] Y (10,...) Y
model
L.AMT10 0.096∗∗∗ -0.024 -0.038∗ -0.005 -0.085∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.026)
L.Termstructure 10y-6m -0.060∗∗ 0.051∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.033
(0.028) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.031)
L.Yield 6m 0.007 0.057∗∗∗ 0.007 0.002 -0.015
(0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019)
L.Spread to Germany 10y 0.013 -0.013 -0.027 -0.002 -0.061∗∗
(0.026) (0.025) (0.018) (0.025) (0.027)
L.Non-IG Rating Dummy 0.095 -0.098 -1.564 -2.021 0.096
(0.215) (0.250) (.) (.) (0.280)
Recession Dummy 0.061 0.027 -0.016 -0.086∗ -0.032
(0.056) (0.047) (0.043) (0.049) (0.067)
Total Real GDP Q4 Growth -0.000 -0.006 -0.012∗ 0.009 0.005
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012)
L.Inflation -0.049∗∗∗ 0.012 0.028∗∗ 0.027∗∗ -0.007
(0.017) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020)
L.Debt to GDP Ratio 0.147 -0.022 0.068 0.170∗∗ 0.209∗∗
(0.094) (0.084) (0.065) (0.072) (0.099)
Total Debt to GDP Q4 Change -0.868∗∗∗ -0.338 0.307 0.181 0.623∗
(0.294) (0.284) (0.240) (0.252) (0.346)
Constant 0.242∗ -0.143 -0.150 -0.236∗∗ 0.255∗
(0.141) (0.128) (0.117) (0.116) (0.155)
sigma
Constant 0.416∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.018) (0.022) (0.016) (0.019)
Onservations 625 625 625 625 625
Pseudo R2 0.0435 0.0402 0.0738 0.0492 0.0314
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Table 4: Time-Variation of Governments’ Gap-Filling
This table reports Tobit model regression results of governments share of short-term (up to one
year) and long-term (greater than ten years) debt issues across two subperiods, on lagged AMT10
and control variables. The data sample is based on governments individual debt issues from 1999:q1
to 2015:q3 and is obtained from Bloomberg. The two subperiods span from 1999:q1-2009:q4, and
2010:q1-2015:q3. The dependent variable is a governments’ share of debt issues of (0,1] years,
or (10,...) years of maturity in a given quarter. The share of debt issues is computed as the
aggregated issuance amount of debt issues with maturities in the respective maturity range over
the total issue amount across all maturities within a quarter. The Tobit model accounts for the
share of debt issues being bounded between zero and one. AMT10 is the log of the aggregated
amount of long-term (above 10 years) Eurozone government debt issues. Robust standard errors
are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level respectively.
1999-2009 2010-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(0,1] Y (10,...) Y (0,1] Y (10,...) Y
model
L.AMT10 0.058∗ -0.032 0.129∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.037) (0.038) (0.040)
L.Termstructure 10y-6m -0.051 -0.055 -0.064 0.143∗∗
(0.043) (0.053) (0.045) (0.060)
L.Yield 6m 0.051 -0.091∗∗ 0.082 -0.077
(0.035) (0.043) (0.050) (0.068)
L.Spread to Germany 10y 0.059 -0.130 -0.048 -0.040
(0.097) (0.111) (0.045) (0.052)
L.Non-IG Rating Dummy 0.240 -0.049
(0.222) (0.279)
Recession Dummy 0.085 -0.033 0.008 0.013
(0.073) (0.084) (0.108) (0.124)
Total Real GDP Q4 Growth -0.007 0.001 0.004 0.029
(0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.021)
L.Inflation -0.073∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.020 -0.001
(0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.038)
L.Debt to GDP Ratio 0.223∗ 0.148 0.126 0.248
(0.119) (0.130) (0.163) (0.160)
Total Debt to GDP Q4 Change -1.258∗∗∗ 0.933∗ -0.763 0.561
(0.392) (0.503) (0.465) (0.503)
Constant 0.247 0.438 0.134 0.347∗
(0.233) (0.279) (0.191) (0.196)
sigma
Constant 0.404∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.020) (0.027) (0.036)
Observations 409 409 216 216
Pseudo R2 0.0566 0.0316 0.0687 0.1174
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Table 5: Cross-Section of Governments’ Gap-Filling, 2010-2015
This table reports Tobit model regression results of governments share of long-term (above 10 years) debt issues across different subsamples, on lagged
AMT10 and control variables. The data sample is based on governments individual debt issues from 2010:q1 to 2015:q3 and is obtained from Bloomberg.
The subsamples separate governments across indebtedness, size, funding needs, budget deficit, economic growth, and rating. The dependent variable is a
governments’ share of debt issues of (10,...) years of maturity in a given quarter. The share of debt issues is computed as the aggregated issuance amount
of debt issues with maturities above 10 years over the total issue amount across all maturities within a quarter. The Tobit model accounts for the share of
debt issues being bounded between zero and one. AMT10 is the log of the aggregated amount of long-term (above 10 years) Eurozone government debt
issues. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
Indebtedness Size Funding needs Budget deficit Economic growth Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
low high small large low high low high high low high low
L.AMT10 -0.365∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗ -0.106∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗
(0.097) (0.044) (0.086) (0.028) (0.074) (0.051) (0.070) (0.052) (0.051) (0.063) (0.053) (0.055)
L.Termstructure 10y-6m 0.276∗ 0.067 0.307∗ 0.083∗∗ -0.078 0.106 -0.011 0.217∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.057 0.120 0.146
(0.140) (0.059) (0.162) (0.035) (0.096) (0.080) (0.108) (0.076) (0.078) (0.081) (0.078) (0.103)
L.Yield 6m -0.115 -0.089 -0.459∗∗ 0.025 -0.170 -0.099 -0.034 -0.077 -0.212∗∗ 0.026 -0.054 -0.028
(0.173) (0.064) (0.183) (0.050) (0.131) (0.073) (0.123) (0.087) (0.092) (0.084) (0.091) (0.103)
L.Spread to Germany 10y -0.050 -0.003 -0.054 0.011 0.166 -0.047 0.040 -0.068 -0.037 -0.079 -0.011 -0.064
(0.116) (0.053) (0.120) (0.040) (0.127) (0.052) (0.110) (0.059) (0.059) (0.108) (0.075) (0.097)
Macroeconomic Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 106 110 106 110 109 107 79 137 124 92 155 61
Pseudo R2 0.1643 0.1159 0.1492 0.3225 0.1560 0.2130 0.1205 0.1609 0.2150 0.0871 0.1126 0.2311
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Table 6: Gov. Debt Holdings of Eurozone Banks Around ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This table reports summary statistics of country-level government debt holdings for publicly listed
banks in the Eurozone from the European Banking Authority (EBA) reported in Acharya and
Steffen (2015). Panel A reports aggregate holdings in Irish, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish
government bonds of banks in GIIPS countries (GIIPS: Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain)
as of December 2011 and June 2012. Panel B reports changes in GIIPS government bond holdings
by banks across different countries between December 2011 and June 2012 at the country level
and by bond maturity (≤ 3 years, > 3 years). Changes in GIIPS government bond holdings of
banks in core countries are also aggregated across countries. Core countries are Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, and the Netherlands.
Panel A: Panel B:
GIIPS Sov. Bond Holdings Change GIIPS Sov. Bond Holdings
(in EUR million) (in EUR million)
Dec 2011 Jun 2012 ≤ 3 years > 3 years
Ireland 10,487 11,938 1,511 119
Italy 153,923 189,508 27,355 7,261
Portugal 15,467 20,544 3,215 36
Spain 115,594 127,847 7,446 5,268
Core N/A N/A -4,121 -4,731
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Table 7: Gap-Filling by Core Governments at ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This table reports the estimates of the change in governments’ debt maturity choices following the
ECB’s three-year LTRO announcement. The dependent variable in all specifications is the share of
debt issues of maturity (range) m of country i in quarter t. The LTRO-period spans from 2012:q1
to 2012:q3. The first and second row test the changes in the share of short-term (≤ 3 years) and
long-term (> 3 years) debt issues separately for core and peripheral countries and include country
fixed effects. The third row tests the difference between the changes in the share of short-term
(≤ 3 years) and long-term (> 3 years) debt issues separately for core and peripheral countries
and includes country-maturity and country-time fixed effects. The fourth row tests the difference
between core and peripheral countries difference between the changes in the share of short-term
(≤ 3 years) and long-term (> 3 years) debt issues and includes country-maturity, country-time,
and maturity-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
ShareIssuei,short,t ShareIssuei,long,t ShareIssuei,m,t ShareIssuei,m,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Peripheral × LTRO 0.199∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030)
Core × LTRO -0.145∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040)
Peripheral × Long × LTRO -0.397∗∗∗ -0.483∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.059)
Core × Long × LTRO 0.290∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗
(0.075) (0.079)
R-squared 0.227 0.227 0.344 0.434
Observations 151 151 302 302
Country FE Yes Yes
Country-Maturity FE Yes Yes
Country-Quarter FE Yes Yes
Maturity-Quarter FE Yes
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Table 8: Placebo Test: No Gap-Filling at ECB’s first Targeted LTRO
This table reports the estimates of the change in governments’ debt maturity choices following the
ECB’s first four-year targeted (T)LTRO announcement. The dependent variable in all specifica-
tions is the share of debt issues of maturity (range)m of country i in quarter t. The TLTRO1-period
spans from 2014:q4 to 2015:q3. The sample period end is extended by three quarters so that the
entire sample perios spans from 2010:q1 to 2015:q3. The first and second row test the changes in
the share of short-term (≤ 4 years) and long-term (> 4 years) debt issues separately for core and
peripheral countries and include country fixed effects. The third row tests the difference between
the changes in the share of short-term (≤ 4 years) and long-term (> 4 years) debt issues separately
for core and peripheral countries and includes country-maturity and country-time fixed effects.
The fourth row tests the difference between core and peripheral countries difference between the
changes in the share of short-term (≤ 4 years) and long-term (> 4 years) debt issues and includes
country-maturity, country-time, and maturity-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level
respectively.
ShareIssuei,short,t ShareIssuei,long,t ShareIssuei,m,t ShareIssuei,m,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Peripheral × TLTRO1 -0.012 0.012 -0.012 -0.019
(0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052)
Core × TLTRO1 0.067 -0.067 0.067 0.059
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
Peripheral × Long × TLTRO1 0.025 0.039
(0.101) (0.103)
Core × Long × TLTRO1 -0.134 -0.117
(0.074) (0.075)
R-squared 0.178 0.178 0.386 0.475
Observations 183 183 366 366
Country FE Yes Yes
Country-Maturity FE Yes Yes
Country-Quarter FE Yes Yes
Maturity-Quarter FE Yes
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Table 9: Deviations from Debt Issuance Announcements after ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This table reports estimation results of linear regressions on issuance adjustments in government’s
debt auctions. Issuance adjustments are measured as the realized debt auction amount relative
to the announced debt issues’ minimum final outstanding amount for Italy (columns (1) and (2)),
and relative to the announced debt auction target amount for Germany (columns (3) and (4)).
Columns (1) and (3) provide results for multivariate regressions without fixed effects. Columns
(2) and (4) provide results for multivariate regressions controlling for maturity segment, tranche,
and quarter fixed effects. The relevant variables are indicator variables indicating whether a debt
auction was announced prior to the inception of the ECB’s three-year LTRO and auctioned during
the LTRO-period for short-term (up to three years) and long-term (greater than three years)
maturities. The bottom part of the table shows the hypothesis test (H0: LTRO x Long-Term –
LTRO x Short-Term = 0) and the hypothesis test’s p-value. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the maturity segment level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
Italy: Germany:
Measuring Issuance Adjustments Measuring Issuance Adjustments
Relative to Announced Relative to Announced
Minimum Total Debt Issue Amounts Target Auction Amounts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Realized over Realized over Realized over Realized over
Announced Announced Announced Announced
Amount Amount Amount Amount
LTRO x Long-Term -0.220∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020)
LTRO x Short-Term -0.048 -0.080∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.025) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
Maturity Segment F.E. Yes Yes
Tranche F.E. Yes Yes
Quarter F.E. Yes Yes
Observations 222 222 304 304
Adj. R2 0.319 0.754 0.077 0.118
H0 -0.171∗∗ -0.030 0.072∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗
p-value 0.002 0.320 0.007 0.018
53
Appendix
Figure A.1: Longer Maturity Debt Issues Around ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This figure shows the fraction of longer maturity debt issues around the ECB’s three-year LTRO.
Longer maturity debt issues are debt issues with maturities of (3,...) years. The sample of gov-
ernments is split into peripheral and core Eurozone governments. Fractions are computed based
on aggregated debt issuance amounts across governments within a government group with debt
maturities above three years over total debt issuance amounts within the same group. Fractions
are computed over the pre-LTRO- (2010:q1-2011:q4), LTRO- (2012:q1-2012:q3), and post-LTRO-
period (2012:q4-2014:q3), respectively.
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Figure A.2: Maturity Buckets of Debt Issues Around ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This figure shows the fraction of debt issues across five maturity buckets around the ECB’s three-
year LTRO. Debt issues are split into maturities of (0,1] year, (1,3] years, (3,5] years, (5,10]
years, and (10,...) years. Panel A reports results for peripheral Eurozone governments, and Panel
B for core Eurozone governments. Fractions are computed based on aggregated debt issuance
amounts across governments within a government group with debt maturities in the respective
maturity bucket over total debt issuance amounts within the same group. Fractions are computed
over the pre-LTRO- (2010:q1-2011:q4), LTRO- (2012:q1-2012:q3), and post-LTRO-period (2012:q4-
2014:q3), respectively.
(a) Peripheral Eurozone governments
Figure A. 2: Maturity Buckets of Debt Issues Around ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This figure shows the fraction of debt issues across five maturity buckets around the ECB’s three-
year LTRO. Debt issues are split into maturities of (0,1] year, (1,3] years, (3,5] years, (5,10]
years, and (10,...) years. Panel A reports results for peripheral Eurozone governments, and Panel
B for core Eurozone governments. Fractions are computed based on aggregated debt issuance
amounts across governments within a government group with debt maturities in the respective
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(b) Core Eurozone governments
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This figure shows the fraction of debt issues across five maturity buckets around the ECB’s three-
year LTRO. Debt issues are split into maturities of (0,1] year, (1,3] years, (3,5] years, (5,10]
years, and (10,...) years. Panel A reports results for peripheral Eurozone governments, and Panel
B for core Eurozone governments. Fractions are computed based on aggregated debt issuance
amounts across governments within a government group with debt maturities in the respective
maturity bucket over total debt issuance amo nts within t e same group. Fractions are computed
over the pre-LTRO- (2010:q1-2011:q4), LTRO- (2012:q1-2012:q3), and post-LTRO-period (2012:q4-
2014:q3), respectively.
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Table A.1: Description of Variables
The table describes all variables and their units of measurement. The variables are split
in deal characterstics, issuer characteristics, and market characteristics.
Variable Name Unit Description
Panel A: Deal Characteristics
Years to Final Maturity Years Years until final maturity of a debt issue.
Deal Amount EUR bn Notional issue amount in prices of 2010;
converted to EUR at the exchange rate of
the bond issue, if in non-EUR currency.
Euro Denomination Dummy Dummy Indicator variable; takes a value of one if
debt is issued in EUR currency.
Zero/Fixed Coupon Dummy Dummy Indicator variable; takes a value of one if
debt is issued as zero or fixed coupon
bond.
Not Inflation Linked Dummy Dummy Indicator variable; takes a value of one if
debt issue is not an inflation-linked
security.
Repayment at Maturity Dummy Dummy Indicator variable; takes a value of one if
debt issue repays at final maturity.
Panel B: Issuer Characteristics
Qtly. Share of Debt Issues (0,1]Y % Quarterly amount of debt issues with
maturities up to one year, over the total
quarterly amount of debt issues.
Qtly. Share of Debt Issues (1,3]Y % Quarterly amount of debt issues with
maturities greater than one year but not
exceeding three years of maturity, over
the total quarterly amount of debt issues.
Qtly. Share of Debt Issues (3,5]Y % Quarterly amount of debt issues with
maturities greater than three years but
not exceeding five years of maturity, over
the total quarterly amount of debt issues.
Qtly. Share of Debt Issues (5,10]Y % Quarterly amount of debt issues with
maturities greater than five years but not
exceeding ten years of maturity, over the
total quarterly amount of debt issues.
Qtly. Share of Debt Issues (10,...)Y % Quarterly amount of debt issues with
maturities greater than ten years, over
the total quarterly amount of debt issues.
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Table A.1: Description of Variables
(continued)
Panel B: Issuer Characteristics
Non-IG Rating Dummy Dummy Indicator variable; takes a value of one if
the government has a long-term
local-currency credit rating by S&P of
BBB- or higher.
Recession Dummy Dummy Indicator variable; takes a value of one if
the governments last two consecutive
quarters had negative GDP growth.
Total GDP 4Q Growth % The Countries growth in real GDP
during the past four quarters.
Inflation % The Countries consumer price inflation
(CPI) during the prior twelve month.
Debt/GDP Ratio Ratio The countries total government debt over
GDP of the previous year.
Total Debt/GDP 4Q Change Ratio The total change in the governments’
debt/GDP ratio in the previous four
quarters.
Peripheral × LTRO Dummy Interaction term of indicator variable
“Peripheral” that takes a value of one if
the country is Italy or Spain; and the
indicator variable “LTRO” that takes a
value of one if the quarter is included in
the ECB’s LTRO-period from 2012:q1 to
2012:q3.
Core × LTRO Dummy Interaction term of indicator variable
“Core” that takes a value of one if the
country is Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, the Netherlands; and
the indicator variable “LTRO”.
Peripheral × Long × LTRO Dummy Interaction term of indicator variable
“Peripheral”, “Long” that takes a value
of one for the share of debt issues with
maturities above three years, and
“LTRO”.
Core × Long × LTRO Dummy Interaction term of indicator variable
“Core”, “Long” and “LTRO”.
Peripheral × TLTRO1 Dummy Interaction term of indicator variable
“Peripheral” and the indicator variable
“TLTRO1” that takes a value of one if
the quarter is included in the ECB’s
TLTRO1 period from 2014:q4 to 2015:q3.
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Table A.1: Description of Variables
(continued)
Panel B: Issuer Characteristics
Core × TLTRO1 Dummy Interaction term of indicator variable
“Core” and the indicator variable
“TLTRO1”.
Peripheral × Long × TLTRO1 Dummy Interaction term of indicator variable
“Peripheral”, “Long” and “TLTRO1”.
Core × Long × TLTRO1 Dummy Interaction term of indicator variable
“Core”, “Long” and “TLTRO1”.
Panel C: Market Characteristics
AMT10 Log
(EUR bn)
Natural logarithm of the sum of deal
amounts of Eurozone government debt
issues with maturities above ten years.
Termstructure 10y-6m % Difference between the percentage yields
of 10-year and 6-month government
securities.
Yield 6m % The percentage yield of 6-month
government securities.
Spread to Germany 10y % The Difference between the percentage
yields of 10-year government securities
and 10-year German government
securities.
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Table A.2: Government Debt Managers in the Eurozone
The table reports the debt managers of Eurozone governments in the sample. Information on debt
managers include the name, institutional position within the government, and website.
Country Debt Manager Institutional postion Website
Austria Österreichische
Bundesfinanzagentur
Part of the Ministry
of Finance
www.oebfa.at/en
Belgium Agence Fédérale de la
Dette/Federaal Agentschap
van de Schuld
Part of the Federal Public
Service Finance
www.debtagency.be/en
Cyprus Public Debt Management
Office
Part of the Ministry
of Finance
www.mof.gov.cy/mof/
pdmo/pdmo.nsf/
index_en/index_en
Finland Valtiokonttori State Treasury responsible
to the Ministry of Finance
www.statetreasury.fi/
en-US
France Agence France Trésor Part of the Ministry of the
Economy and Finance
www.aft.gouv.fr/
Germany Bundesrepublik Deutschland -
Finanzagentur GmbH
Limited company with the
Federal Republic of
Germany, represented by
the Federal Ministry of
Finance, as sole
shareholder
www.deutsche-
finanzagentur.de/en
Greece Public Debt Management
Agency
Board of Directors is
appointed by the Minister
of Finance, Agency
responsible to the
Ministry of Finance
www.pdma.gr/en
Ireland National Treasury
Management Agency
Chairperson is appointed
by the Minister of
Finance, Agency
responsible to the
Ministry of Finance
www.ntma.ie
Italy Dipartimento del Tesoro Part of the Ministry of
Economy and Finance
www.dt.tesoro.it/en/
Malta Debt Management Directorate Part of the Treasury
Department
treasury.gov.mt/en
Netherlands Agentschap van de Generale
Thesaurie
Part of the Ministry
of Finance
english.dsta.nl
Portugal Agência de Gestão da
Tesouraria e da Dívida
Pública - IGCP, E.P.E.
Agency supervised by the
Finance Minister
www.igcp.pt/en
Slovakia Agentúry pre riadenie dlhu a
likvidity
Agency responsible to the
Ministry of Finance
www.ardal.sk/en
Slovenia Ministrstvo za finance Part of the Ministry
of Finance
www.mf.gov.si/en
Spain Tesoro Público Part of the Ministry of
Economy, Industry and
Competitiveness
www.tesoro.es/en
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Table A.3: Gap-Filling Government Debt Maturity Choice (OLS Models), 1999-2015
This table reports OLS model regression results of governments share of short-term and long-term
debt issues, on lagged AMT10 and control variables. The data sample is based on governments
individual debt issues from 1999:q1 to 2015:q3 and is obtained from Bloomberg. The dependent
variable is a governments’ share of debt issues in the short-term maturity segments of (0,1] years,
and the long-term maturity segments of (10,...) years in a given quarter. The share of debt issues is
computed as the aggregated issuance amount in the respective maturity segment over the total issue
amount across maturity segments within a quarter. AMT10 is the log of the aggregated amount
of long-term (above 10 years) Eurozone government debt issues. Panel A reports results for short-
term debt issues, and Panel B reports results for long-term debt issues. Heteroscedasticity-robust
and clustered standard errors at the government-level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
(a) Short-Term Debt Issues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0,1] Y (0,1] Y (0,1] Y (0,1] Y (0,1] Y (0,1] Y
L.AMT10 0.078∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.027)
L.Termstructure 10y-6m -0.036 -0.065 0.009 0.030 0.017 0.010
(0.033) (0.061) (0.055) (0.053) (0.056) (0.057)
L.Yield 6m 0.010 0.042 0.117∗ 0.088 0.080 0.087
(0.020) (0.064) (0.060) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053)
L.Spread to Germany 10y -0.007 -0.034 -0.107∗ -0.084 -0.078 -0.117
(0.030) (0.059) (0.055) (0.051) (0.049) (0.112)
Macroeconomic Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes
Country-Quarter FE Yes
Country-Year FE Yes
Observations 625 625 625 625 625 625
R2 0.0671 0.0989 0.1635 0.3925 0.4966 0.5557
(b) Long-Term Debt Issues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(10,...) Y (10,...) Y (10,...) Y (10,...) Y (10,...) Y (10,...) Y
L.AMT10 -0.047∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021)
L.Termstructure 10y-6m -0.002 0.061 0.011 0.004 0.022 -0.006
(0.013) (0.041) (0.038) (0.042) (0.045) (0.052)
L.Yield 6m -0.012 0.007 -0.042 -0.039 -0.035 -0.034
(0.009) (0.036) (0.030) (0.027) (0.028) (0.037)
L.Spread to Germany 10y -0.017 -0.037 0.012 -0.015 -0.018 -0.016
(0.016) (0.042) (0.038) (0.041) (0.043) (0.084)
Macroeconomic Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes
Country-Quarter FE Yes
Country-Year FE Yes
Observations 625 625 625 625 625 625
R2 0.0302 0.0655 0.1376 0.1718 0.3051 0.3288
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Table A.4: Gap-Filling by Government Group, 2010-2015
This table reports Tobit model regression results of governments share of debt issues across five
maturity segments for different government groups, on lagged AMT10 and control variables. The
data sample is based on governments individual debt issues from 2010:q1 to 2015:q3 and is obtained
from Bloomberg. The dependent variable is a governments’ share of debt issues in a maturity seg-
ments (0,1], (1,3], (3,5], (5,10], and (10,...) years in a given quarter. The share of debt issues is
computed as the aggregated issuance amount in the respective maturity segment over the total
issue amount across maturity segments within a quarter. The Tobit model accounts for the share
of debt issues being bounded between zero and one. AMT10 is the log of the aggregated amount
of long-term (above 10 years) Eurozone government debt issues. Panel A reports results for pe-
ripheral governments, and Panel B reports results for core governments. Robust standard errors
are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level respectively.
(a) Peripheral Governments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0,1] Y (1,3] Y (3,5] Y (5,10] Y (10,...) Y
L.AMT10 0.194∗∗∗ -0.043 0.041 -0.030 -0.198∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.043) (0.034) (0.047) (0.048)
L.Termstructure 10y-6m -0.061 0.079 0.037 -0.011 0.005
(0.091) (0.071) (0.053) (0.070) (0.075)
L.Yield 6m 0.064 0.072 -0.009 -0.075 -0.098
(0.075) (0.068) (0.055) (0.078) (0.086)
L.Spread to Germany 10y 0.034 -0.069 -0.046 0.039 -0.082
(0.068) (0.046) (0.044) (0.071) (0.064)
Macroeconomic Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 73 73 73 73 73
Pseudo R2 0.2772 0.2981 0.6184 0.2368 0.2803
(b) Core Governments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0,1] Y (1,3] Y (3,5] Y (5,10] Y (10,...) Y
L.AMT10 0.091∗ 0.012 0.002 -0.001 -0.163∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.040) (0.052) (0.044) (0.058)
L.Termstructure 10y-6m -0.030 0.016 0.035 -0.010 0.223∗∗
(0.064) (0.065) (0.060) (0.056) (0.087)
L.Yield 6m 0.145 -0.067 0.060 0.014 -0.250∗∗
(0.117) (0.093) (0.094) (0.100) (0.117)
L.Spread to Germany 10y -0.077 -0.342∗∗ -0.030 0.063 0.098
(0.076) (0.152) (0.068) (0.079) (0.096)
Macroeconomic Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 143 143 143 143 143
Pseudo R2 0.0577 0.2189 0.0296 0.0657 0.1168
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Table A.5: Gap-Filling After the Eurozone Crisis, 2012:q4-2015:q3
This table reports Tobit model regression results of governments share of debt issues across five
maturity segments, on lagged AMT10 and control variables. The data sample is based on gov-
ernments individual debt issues following the Eurozone crisis (from 2012:q4 to 2015:q3) and is
obtained from Bloomberg. The dependent variable is a governments’ share of debt issues in a
maturity segments (0,1], (1,3], (3,5], (5,10], and (10,...) years in a given quarter. The share of debt
issues is computed as the aggregated issuance amount in the respective maturity segment over the
total issue amount across maturity segments within a quarter. The Tobit model accounts for the
share of debt issues being bounded between zero and one. AMT10 is the log of the aggregated
amount of long-term (above 10 years) Eurozone government debt issues. Robust standard errors
are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0,1] Y (1,3] Y (3,5] Y (5,10] Y (10,...) Y
model
L.AMT10 0.133∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.032 0.023 -0.170∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.039) (0.050) (0.046) (0.050)
L.Termstructure 10y-6m -0.012 -0.007 0.065 0.079 -0.006
(0.091) (0.071) (0.077) (0.085) (0.118)
L.Yield 6m 0.193 0.071 -0.058 -0.023 -0.410∗∗
(0.145) (0.130) (0.104) (0.144) (0.160)
L.Spread to Germany 10y -0.155 0.026 -0.008 0.038 0.172
(0.112) (0.098) (0.097) (0.110) (0.138)
L.Non-IG Rating Dummy 0.445∗ -0.147 -1.938 -2.547 -0.114
(0.243) (0.252) (.) (.) (0.310)
Recession Dummy 0.104 0.008 -0.028 -0.174 -0.006
(0.173) (0.077) (0.123) (0.117) (0.184)
Total Real GDP Q4 Growth 0.055 -0.014 -0.112∗∗∗ -0.021 0.029
(0.037) (0.023) (0.039) (0.036) (0.037)
L.Inflation 0.094 -0.046 -0.189∗∗∗ -0.022 0.040
(0.082) (0.051) (0.067) (0.084) (0.102)
L.Debt to GDP Ratio 0.510∗ 0.229 -0.129 -0.093 0.333
(0.275) (0.198) (0.212) (0.300) (0.290)
Total Debt to GDP Q4 Change -0.575 -0.416 0.405 -0.400 0.352
(0.782) (0.607) (0.822) (0.857) (0.935)
Constant -0.309 -0.206 0.127 -0.164 0.335
(0.286) (0.205) (0.266) (0.276) (0.310)
sigma
Constant 0.425∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.043) (0.053) (0.036) (0.055)
Observations 110 110 110 110 110
Pseudo R2 0.1028 0.1022 0.2174 0.1029 0.1400
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Table A.6: Gap-Filling by Core Gov. (excluding Germany) at ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This table reports the estimates of the change in governments’ debt maturity choices following the
ECB’s three-year LTRO announcement, excluding Germany as core government. The dependent
variable in all specifications is the share of debt issues of maturity (range) m of country i in quarter
t. The LTRO-period spans from 2012:q1 to 2012:q3. The first and second row test the changes in
the share of short-term (≤ 3 years) and long-term (> 3 years) debt issues separately for core and
peripheral countries and include country fixed effects. The third row tests the difference between
the changes in the share of short-term (≤ 3 years) and long-term (> 3 years) debt issues separately
for core and peripheral countries and includes country-maturity and country-time fixed effects.
The fourth row tests the difference between core and peripheral countries difference between the
changes in the share of short-term (≤ 3 years) and long-term (> 3 years) debt issues and includes
country-maturity, country-time, and maturity-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level
respectively.
Dependent Variable ShareIssuei,short,t ShareIssuei,long,t ShareIssuei,m,t ShareIssuei,m,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Peripheral × LTRO 0.199∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030)
Core × LTRO -0.150∗∗ 0.150∗∗ -0.150∗∗ -0.114∗∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
Peripheral × Long × LTRO -0.397∗∗∗ -0.473∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.060)
Core × Long × LTRO 0.300∗∗ 0.227∗∗
(0.090) (0.093)
R-squared 0.233 0.233 0.353 0.447
Observations 132 132 264 264
Country FE Yes Yes
Country-Maturity FE Yes Yes
Country-Quarter FE Yes Yes
Maturity-Quarter FE Yes
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